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Broadband, the States, and Section 706: 
Regulatory Federalism in the  
Open Internet Era 
by CHARLES M. DAVIDSON* AND MICHAEL J. SANTORELLI** 
Abstract: The relationship between federal and state regulators in the 
U.S. telecommunications space has long been fraught with tension regarding 
the boundaries of regulatory authority over communications services of all 
kinds.  Unlike with basic services like traditional telephony, however, 
Congress expressed a clear preference for leaving advanced services like 
broadband “unfettered” by both state and federal regulation, a preference 
that for many years was taken literally by the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC), resulting in a minimalist approach that prevailed for 
more than a decade.  Though incredibly successful when measured by a 
range of metrics, federal regulators recently elected to dramatically alter this 
approach to broadband.  This decision has raised many questions about the 
reach of FCC authority over broadband and whether its sweeping 
reinterpretation of federal law might have unlocked new state level authority 
over services once thought to be immune from such piecemeal regulation.  
This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of these recent changes 
and evaluates whether and to what extent state regulators might have 
authority to regulate elements of broadband service in their states under 
section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.  The text of this 
provision, as reinterpreted by the FCC and upheld by federal appeals courts, 
calls on both the FCC and individual state public utility commissions (PUCs) 
to encourage the deployment of broadband services by using an array of 
“regulating methods” to remove barriers to investment.  Some have argued 
that the FCC’s recent decision to reclassify broadband as a 
telecommunications service subject to common carrier regulation bolsters 
the case for a more active state role, as this regulatory paradigm was long 
defined by its dual federal state character. In reality, though, federal statutes, 
FCC precedent, federal case law, and a range of other factors make clear that 
any regulatory authority over broadband accruing to the states under section 
706 is very narrow, if it exists at all, and subject to a number of limitations, 
including federal preemption.  
 
    *  Director, Advanced Communications Law & Policy Institute at New York Law School.  
  **  Director, Advanced Communications Law & Policy Institute at New York Law School.  
The views expressed herein are those of the authors alone.  
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The states, though, are not without recourse when attempting to improve 
broadband connectivity.  Indeed, governors, legislatures, attorneys general, 
PUCs, and numerous other state actors have many tools and resources at 
their disposal for bolstering broadband deployment and adoption.  As such, 
state PUCs should not look to section 706 as a panacea for solving broadband 
woes.  Rather, this paper argues that section 706 is best interpreted against 
the larger backdrop of the totality of state efforts to advance broadband in 
line with policy imperatives articulated by state level officials.  Doing so will 
yield more comprehensive, effective, and viable broadband strategies.  
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I. Introduction 
In January 2014, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals issued a ruling in 
the case of Verizon v. FCC1 that struck down major elements of the Federal 
Communications Commission’s (FCC or Commission) Open Internet Order 
of 2010. 2   In doing so, however, the D.C. Circuit accepted the FCC’s 
expansive theory regarding its general authority to regulate broadband 
Internet access services.3  This theory, which was mapped out in detail in the 
2010 order,4 revolved primarily around a new interpretation of section 706 
of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. 5   According to the FCC’s 
interpretation, which was deemed “reasonable” by the D.C. Circuit,6 the 
Commission, contrary to previous understandings,7 appears to have broad 
authority under section 706 to “adopt . . . rules in order to promote 
competition and investment in voice, video, and audio services.”8  This 
authority is not limitless, but it is substantial.9 
Less discussed in the aftermath of Verizon and the FCC’s subsequent 
efforts to respond to the ruling was whether and how this new understanding 
of section 706 applies to the states.  This is an incredibly important 
discussion to have since, according to section 706(a): 
 
The Commission and each State commission with regulatory 
jurisdiction over telecommunications services shall encourage the 
 
 1.  740 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 2014).  
 2.  See In re Preserving the Open Internet, 25 FCC Rcd. 17,905 (2010) (hereinafter 2010 
Open Internet Order).  The court vacated antidiscrimination and anti-blocking rules, but upheld a 
disclosure rule, which required broadband service providers to be more transparent about their 
network management practices and other aspects of Internet access service.  Verizon, 740 F.3d at 
628. 
 3.  The court held that the Commission’s rules pertaining to blocking and discrimination 
were tantamount to common carrier regulation and thus in conflict with prior determinations by the 
FCC that broadband was not to be regulated in such a manner according to its classification as an 
“information service.”  Verizon, 740 F.3d, at 649–50.  
 4.  2010 Open Internet Order, supra note 2, at 17,966–72. 
 5.  Section 706 was enacted as part of the Telecomms. Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-104, 110 
Stat. 153, but was later codified in 47 U.S.C. § 1302.  
 6.  Verizon, 740 F.3d at 636–37. 
 7.  See, e.g., In re Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecomms. 
Capability, 13 F.C.C.R 24,012, 24,047 (1998) (reading section 706 as not “constitut[ing] an 
independent grant of authority.”) (hereinafter 1998 Advanced Services Order). 
 8.  2010 Open Internet Order, supra note 2, at 17,972. 
 9.  The court did note — and accept — two limiting principles offered by the FCC.  Verizon, 
740 F.3d at 639–40.  These limits are discussed in more detail infra section III. 
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deployment on a reasonable and timely basis of advanced 
telecommunications capability to all Americans (including, in 
particular, elementary and secondary schools and classrooms) by 
utilizing, in a manner consistent with the public interest, 
convenience, and necessity, price cap regulation, regulatory 
forbearance, measures that promote competition in the local 
telecommunications market, or other regulating methods that remove 
barriers to infrastructure investment.10 
 
Some argue that this section appears to provide the FCC and each state 
public utility commission (PUC) with concurrent jurisdiction over 
broadband services, subject only to the traditional limitations of regulatory 
power exerted by these bodies — i.e., the FCC only has jurisdiction over 
interstate elements of communications services, while state PUCs have 
primary authority over intrastate aspects of those services.11  Indeed, since 
the Verizon ruling, there have been several citations to section 706(a) in 
support of more expansive PUC jurisdiction over certain aspects of 
broadband service. 12   However, when read in light of established legal 
precedent, related FCC action, including the Commission’s most recent 
attempt to implement open Internet rules, 13  and federal and state laws 
regarding the regulation of advanced communications services like VoIP, the 
more persuasive argument is that the scope of PUC authority under section 
706 is, at most, very narrow and likely non-existent given the looming threat 
of federal preemption.14 
This paper frames the parameters of a much-needed conversation about 
the relationship between section 706, broadband, and the states. In the 
absence of such a frank assessment, there will remain some uncertainty 
 
 10.  47 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (emphasis added). 
 11.  The interplay of state and federal jurisdiction over communications services has long 
been the source of much controversy.  State PUC authority over intrastate elements of service is 
not absolute and has been subject to federal preemption in a number of instances.  For a recent 
example, see In re FCC 11-161, 753 F.3d 1015 (10th Cir. 2014) (upholding FCC preemption of 
state regulations impacting universal service and intercarrier compensation).  For an extended 
discussion, see generally Charles M. Davidson & Michael J. Santorelli, Federalism in Transition: 
Recalibrating the Federal-State Regulatory Balance for the All-IP Era, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 
1131 (2014) (hereinafter Federalism in Transition).  
 12.  See infra Section III, for examples and further discussion. 
 13.  See In re Protecting & Promoting the Open Internet, Report & Order on Remand, 
Declaratory Ruling, & Order, 30 FCC Rcd. 560, GN Docket 14-28 (rel. Mar. 12, 2015) (hereinafter 
2015 Open Internet Order).  
 14.  See infra Sections III and IV for additional discussion.  
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regarding the reach and role of state regulation in the broadband space.15  
Such uncertainty could encourage PUCs to explore the outer limits of their 
perceived authority under the new understanding of section 706, which, in 
turn, would likely trigger disruptive and counterproductive legal clashes 
between service providers, state PUCs, and the FCC.16  The better course 
forward for states looking to improve broadband connectivity would be to 
leverage the ample array of non-regulatory resources at their disposal. 
The paper proceeds as follows: 
 
Section 2 provides essential context for discussions about optimal 
approaches to improving broadband connectivity.  In particular, this section 
examines the historical role of section 706 and of state PUCs in 
implementing the regulatory framework that the Commission developed for 
broadband in the late 1990s and early 2000s.  The section concludes by 
evaluating the results of this framework, measured in terms of growth of the 
broadband ecosystem and the consumer welfare gains it generated. 
 
Section 3 assesses the contours of section 706 authority, post-Verizon 
and in light of recent interpretations of the provision by the FCC.  More 
specifically, this section examines: the shift in interpretation of section 706 
by the FCC; the subsequent acceptance of this new reading by the D.C. 
Circuit; efforts by the FCC to operationalize this provision; and the extent to 
which regulatory entities and other stakeholders are attempting to apply it at 
the state level.  These efforts are evaluated against a backdrop of 
considerable legal, regulatory, and legislative precedent regarding the proper 
balance of regulatory federalism in the modern communications space. 
Section 4 provides a workable path forward for state actors interested 
in improving broadband connectivity.  This path is built upon foundational 
principles stemming from successful approaches to facilitating growth of this 
transformative technology over the last two decades.  The section then 
applies these principles to the modern broadband environment in an effort to 
provide a high-level schematic for state actors — governors, legislatures, 
regulators, and others — interested in working together to improve 
 
 15.  The FCC’s 2015 Open Internet Order did offer some guidance about how it might address 
state attempts to regulate broadband under section 706 going forward.  See, e.g., 2015 Open Internet 
Order, supra note 13 at ¶¶ 430-33.  However, language in the Open Internet Order, and a related 
Order regarding federal preemption of state laws impacting municipal broadband deployment, 
suggest that there remains some uncertainty about the contours of state regulatory authority over 
broadband under the new framework.  For further discussion, see infra Section III.  
 16.  See, e.g., Federalism in Transition, supra note 11 (discussing how this dynamic between 
the FCC and state PUCs has evolved over the last century).  
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broadband.  The tools available for this task do not require section 706 to be 
effective.  Indeed, attempting to use section 706 as a basis for state level 
regulatory intervention would likely undermine the positive efforts of other 
state actors to bolster connectivity.  Accordingly, it is respectfully submitted 
that state PUCs refrain from looking to section 706 as a source of regulatory 
authority over broadband and instead work to determine how best to leverage 
their ample resources and core competencies to supplement other state 
efforts to enhance broadband. 
II.  Section 706, The States, and Broadband Regulation Prior to 
Verizon 
Prior to Verizon and the 2010 open Internet rules, section 706 played 
only a minor role in the broadband space.  Indeed, it mostly served as a 
vehicle for engaging in inquiries regarding broadband deployment in the 
United States; the states played only an advisory role in these efforts.  From 
the perspective of determining the best approach to regulating broadband, 
beginning in the early 2000s the Commission, looking beyond section 706, 
spearheaded the development of a framework for advanced communications 
services that was minimalist in nature and administered primarily at the 
national level. 17   Coupled with state legislation that echoed the general 
deregulatory tenor of FCC action in this space, the prevailing policy 
environment that eventually evolved supported the emergence of a vibrantly 
innovative and intensely competitive broadband ecosystem.  The following 
section traces this evolution and evaluates the many positive impacts that this 
regulatory framework had on broadband and consumers for more than a 
decade. 
A.  Initial Interpretations and Applications of Section 706 by the FCC, 
 
 17.  The “minimalist” and “light touch” framework mentioned throughout this paper refers to 
the regulatory approach to broadband that resulted from classifying it as an “information service.”  
Despite assertions to the contrary, the FCC’s recent decision to reclassify broadband as a 
“telecommunications service” subject to common carrier regulation is neither “light touch” nor 
“minimalist” in nature.  On the contrary, it represents a significant departure from the historical 
approach to advanced services and results in the imposition of numerous new regulatory 
requirements on every type of broadband service provider.  For discussion of likely harms arising 
from such a dramatic shift in regulating broadband, see generally Christopher S. Yoo, Is There a 
Role for Common Carriage in an Internet-Based World?, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 545 (2013).  But see 
2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 13, at ¶¶ 409-25 (arguing that reclassification would not 
negatively impact broadband).  
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and the States 
Shortly after passage of the 1996 Telecommunications Act, the FCC, in 
response to several petitions from service providers, issued an order that, 
among many other things, attempted to begin mapping out a regulatory 
approach that could support continued growth of “advanced services,” 
including broadband.18  The goal of the order, issued in 1998, was to “ensure 
that the marketplace [was] conducive to investment, innovation, and meeting 
the needs of consumers.”19  Part of this order comprised the FCC’s first 
interpretation of section 706.  It concluded that, “in light of the statutory 
language, the framework of the 1996 Act, its legislative history, and 
Congress’ policy objectives, the most logical statutory interpretation is that 
section 706 does not constitute an independent grant of authority.”20  Instead, 
the Commission saw it as a directive to use authority granted elsewhere in 
the Act to encourage broadband deployment.21 
The FCC also contemplated state level regulation of advanced services 
in its 1998 order.  In particular, the Commission surmised that there might 
be intrastate aspects of advanced services, and if there were, states were 
“encourage[d]” to treat those services the same regardless of whether they 
were provided by an incumbent telephone company or “any other competing 
carrier offering advanced services.”22  However, the Commission stopped 
short of mandating a particular regulatory role for the states vis-à-vis 
advanced services, opting instead to gather further comment on potential 
roles.23 
In response to the order and several related entreaties by the FCC,24 the 
National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC), 
which lobbies on behalf of PUCs, acted to stake out the collective position 
of state regulators regarding the proper approach to incubating and 
regulating the nascent advanced communications sector.  In a February 1999 
resolution, for example, NARUC proposed a close working relationship 
 
 18.  1998 Advanced Services Order, supra note 7. 
 19.  Id. at 24,014. 
 20.  Id. at 24,047. 
 21.  Id. at 24,047−48 (concluding that “the better interpretation of section 706 is that it directs 
us to use, among other authority, our forbearance authority under section 10(a) to encourage the 
deployment of advanced services.”).  
 22.  Id. at 24,063.  
 23.  Id. at 24,064. 
 24.  See, e.g., William Kennard, Chairman, FCC.  Speech to the Annual Convention of the 
National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners. (Nov. 10, 1997) 
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between state PUCs and the Commission in furtherance of the policy 
imperatives outlined in the 1996 Act.25  That resolution “commit[ed] state 
commissions and the FCC to take full advantage of their complementary 
strengths, and identifie[d] several specific practices which may be applied in 
various contexts in order to do so.  These include[d] participation in one 
another’s key proceedings, hands-on consultation, best practices guidelines, 
and cooperative development of substantive models or standards.”26  The 
FCC responded in October 1999 by launching the Federal-State Joint 
Conference on Advanced Services (Joint Conference).27 
The Joint Conference, as initially conceived by NARUC and eventually 
formalized by the FCC, was positioned as a means of facilitating an “open 
dialogue” between the Commission and state regulators in an effort to 
determine the most effective means of “encourag[ing] the rapid deployment 
of advanced services to all Americans.”28  In addition to identifying best 
practices for these purposes, a core aim of the Joint Conference, as outlined 
by the FCC in the order establishing it, was to “minimize[e] potential 
inconsistencies and overlaps between federal and state policy.”29  Thereafter, 
the primary role of the Joint Conference was as a forum for identifying 
successful methods of supporting broadband deployment and otherwise 
contributing to the FCC’s determination of whether “advanced 
telecommunications capability” was being deployed in a reasonable and 
timely manner throughout the country.30 
With regard to formal regulatory roles for PUCs vis-à-vis broadband, 
there were two main factors that militated against providing the states with 
latitude for experimenting with new policies.  First, the 1996 Act, a major 
piece of bipartisan legislation, indicated a clear policy preference for leaving 
 
 25.  See Resolution Regarding Petitions to the FCC for Action Under Section 706, NARUC 
(Feb. 1999). 
 26.  See Bob Rowe, Strategies to Promote Advanced Telecommunications Capabilities, 52 
FED. COMM. L.J. 381, 402 (2000). 
 27.  See In re Federal-State Joint Conference on Advanced Telecomms.  Services, Order, 14 
FCC Rcd. 17622 (Oct. 8, 1999), available at https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-
99-293A1.pdf. 
 28.  Id. at 17,624. 
 29.  Id. at 17,625. 
 30.  See, e.g., In re Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecomms. Capability 
to All Americans in a Reasonable & Timely Fashion, & Possible Steps to Accelerate Such 
Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecomms.  Act of 1996, Second Report, 15 FCC Rcd. 
20913, 20916–17 (Aug. 21, 2000) (noting that the “Joint Conference conducted a series of field 
hearings across the country — from Alaska to Miami — to gather data on the deployment of 
advanced telecommunications capability.”). 
4 SANTORELLI-DAVIDSON ARTICLE_FINAL_TOM_GS_NW_MK.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/19/2016  3:08 PM 
SUMMER 2016] BROADBAND, THE STATES, AND SECTION 706 219 
 
the Internet “unfettered by Federal or State regulation.”31  Second, even 
though the FCC initially indicated that the states might have a role to play in 
regulating intrastate aspects of Internet service provided by telephone 
companies, the true nature of the market — a competitive space dominated 
by borderless high-speed services — quickly came into focus as innovative 
alternatives like cable modem service emerged.32  Consequently, the FCC 
began to develop a regulatory framework that better reflected these new 
dynamics, one that was minimalist in nature and administered exclusively at 
the federal level.33  The FCC’s subsequent work echoed the Act’s policy 
statement; its legal authority to do so stemmed from a series of cases that 
indicated that the FCC had broad discretion to interpret and implement the 
Act’s many provisions, even those that seemed to specifically empower the 
states.34 
B.  The Prevailing Regulatory Model: Minimalism in the Regulation of 
Wireless, Broadband, and VoIP 
This basic dynamic — of initially responding to new communications 
technologies by applying (or attempting to apply) existing federal and state 
regulation and then adjusting via deregulation to reflect market 
characteristics — has been evident at the federal level for many years, 
including in the context of wireless telephony, broadband Internet access, 
and IP-enabled services like VoIP.35  The result was the development of 
 
 31.  47 U.S.C. 230(b)(2). 
 32.  See, e.g., JONATHAN E. NUECHTERLEIN & PHILIP J. WEISER, DIGITAL CROSSROADS: 
AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY IN THE INTERNET AGE 205 (The MIT Press 2005) 
(“[b]alkanizing Internet-related services into 50 different schemes of state level common carrier 
regulation would be deeply inconsistent with several of the Internet’s defining characteristics.  
Among these characteristics are the geographical indeterminacy of Internet transmissions, 
including the portability of IP addresses; the Internet’s traditional freedom from regulatory 
intrusion; and, more generally, the Internet’s celebrated tendency to obliterate political boundaries 
of all kinds”). 
 33.  See, e.g., William E. Kennard, Chairman, FCC, Connecting the Globe: A Regulator’s 
Guide to Building a Global Information Community, at IX–2 (1999), available at 
http://www.fcc.gov/connectglobe/regguide.pdf (observing that “Government policy can have a 
profound impact on Internet development; it can either foster it or hinder it.  To date, the Internet 
has flourished in large part due to the absence of regulation.  A “hands-off” approach allows the 
Internet to develop free from the burdens of traditional regulatory mechanisms.”). 
 34.  See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999).  Numerous subsequent cases 
refined the balance of regulatory federalism in the post-1996 Act communications space.  For 
further discussion, see generally Federalism in Transition, supra note 11. 
 35.  The FCC’s 2015 Open Internet Order fundamentally altered this dynamic.  See infra 
Section III for additional discussion.  
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minimalist regulatory frameworks for advanced communications services 
administered primarily at the federal level, leaving states with narrowly 
defined roles that, in many cases, were narrowed even further, or eliminated 
outright, by state legislatures. The following provides an overview. 
1.  Wireless Telephone Regulation 
The FCC was initially very hands-on in regulating the market for 
wireless telephone service, implementing a top-down approach to allocating 
spectrum and otherwise shaping the market for mobile services. 36   In 
addition, many state PUCs extended common carrier rules to wireless voice 
providers, reasoning that intrastate voice communications of any kind 
automatically fell within their regulatory purview. 37   However, once it 
became evident that this piecemeal state-federal regulatory approach 
threatened further growth of the wireless market, federal policymakers in 
1993 enacted legislation to clarify what the regulatory framework should 
look like.38  This entailed the development of a national model that freed 
service providers from the “dual . . . regulatory jurisdictional system 
designed to regulate the monopol[istic]” telephone industry.39  Many aspects 
of state regulatory authority over wireless telephony were significantly 
curtailed by the resulting statute. 40   In addition, Congress clarified that 
wireless telephony was to be treated as a common carrier service but was to 
be subject to a narrower set of regulations than traditional wire-based 
telephone service.41  This approach hinged on the fact that wireless voice 
services interconnected with the public switched telephone network 
 
 36.  See, e.g., Charles M. Davidson & Michael J. Santorelli, Seizing the Mobile Moment: 
Spectrum Allocation Policy for the Wireless Broadband Century, 19 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 1, 
29–31 (2010) (discussing this early “command and control” approach) (hereinafter Seizing the 
Mobile Moment). 
 37.  See, e.g., Babette E. Boliek, Wireless Net Neutrality Regulation and the Problem with 
Pricing: An Empirical, Cautionary Tale, 16 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 28–32 (2010) 
(“[T]wenty-nine states had not banned regulation, either by law or by de facto bans on [wireless] 
regulation promulgated by their public utility commissions.”). 
 38.  Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, 47 U.S.C. § 332 (2012). 
 39.  Leonard J. Kennedy & Heather A. Purcell, Section 332 of the Communications Act of 
1934: A Federal Framework That is “Hog Tight, Horse High, and Bull Strong,” 50 FED. COMM. 
L.J. 547, 550 (1998). 
 40.  According to the statute, “no State or local government shall have any authority to 
regulate the entry of or the rates charged by any commercial mobile service or any private mobile 
service, except that this paragraph shall not prohibit a State from regulating the other terms and 
conditions of commercial mobile services.” 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3)(A) (2012). 
 41.  See 47 U.S.C. §§ 332(c)(1)-(8) (2012). 
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(“PSTN”), which had long delivered traditional voice service to customers 
across the country.42 
This explicit embrace of a relatively minimalist approach to a voice 
service,43 coupled with concomitant changes to federal spectrum allocation 
policy and subsequent state legislation further curtailing PUC involvement 
with wireless issues, 44  facilitated the rapid deployment of nationwide 
wireless networks.45  In recent years, these gains have been bolstered by FCC 
action to streamline state and local processes impacting wireless network 
deployment (e.g., siting)46 and by legislation in many states to either remove 
any regulatory oversight of wireless from PUCs or to streamline related 
processes (e.g., consumer complaints).47 
 
 42.  See 47 U.S.C. § 332(d) (2012). 
 43.  The FCC implicitly acknowledged such relative minimalism when implementing the new 
regulatory framework for wireless voice services in the mid-1990s.  In particular, the Commission 
noted that: While the [1993 Act] ensures that all CMRS providers will be subject to certain key 
requirements of Title II, Congress has given the Commission authority to forbear from applying 
other Title II provisions if such regulation is not needed to prevent unreasonably discriminatory 
rates or practices, or to protect consumers, and if such forbearance is consistent with the public 
interest (e.g., the Commission action, by augmenting competition, promotes better services for 
consumers at reasonable prices).  By taking these steps, Congress acknowledged that neither 
traditional state regulation, nor conventional regulation under Title II of the Communications Act, 
may be necessary in all cases to promote competition or protect consumers in the mobile 
communications marketplace (emphasis added).  See In re Implementation of Sections 3(N) & 332 
of the Commc’ns Act, Regulatory Treatment of Mobile Services, GN Docket No. 93-252, Second 
Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd. 1411, 1481 (released Mar. 7, 1994). 
 44.  See, e.g., Sherry Lichtenberg, Telecommunications Legislation 2014: Completing the 
Process, NRRI Report No. 14-07 (Jun. 2014), http://nrri.org/documents/317330/b72af483-4ac3-
4cc8-9d1f-1871a9284c9a (providing an overview of recent legislation to narrow PUC authority 
over various aspects of wireless service) (hereinafter Completing the Process); Sherry Lichtenberg, 
Examining the Role of State Regulators as Telecommunications Oversight is Reduced, NRRI 
Report 15-07 (Aug. 2015), http://nrri.org/download/nrri-15-07-telecom-regulation/ (hereinafter 
Examining the Role). 
 45.  Seizing the Mobile Moment, supra note 36, at 31–40.  For discussion of specific impacts, 
see infra, section II.B.2. 
 46.  See In re Petition for Declaratory Ruling to Clarify Provisions of Section 332(c)(7)(B) to 
Ensure Timely Siting Review & to Preempt Under Section 253 State & Local Ordinances that 
Classify All Wireless Siting Proposals as Requiring a Variance, WT Docket No. 08-165, 
Declaratory Ruling, 24 FCC Rcd. 13994 (released Nov. 18, 2009) (Declaratory Ruling)  
(implementing a “shot clock” to guide siting review processes) (hereinafter Shot Clock Order); In 
re Acceleration of Broadband Deployment by Improving Wireless Facilities Siting Policies, WT 
Docket No. 13-238, Report and Order, FCC 14-153 (released Oct. 21, 2014) (Report and Order), 
http://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2014/db1021/FCC-14-153A1.pdf 
(providing further guidance on an array of wireless infrastructure-related requirements). 
 47.  See, e.g., Completing the Process, supra note 44; Examining the Role, supra note 44; 
Seizing the Mobile Moment, supra note 36. 
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2.  Broadband Internet Access Regulation 
In the context of high-speed Internet access services, the initial 
regulatory response tilted towards more traditional common carrier policies 
for certain providers.  More specifically, high-speed DSL service offered by 
incumbent telephone companies fell under the regulatory regime that grew 
out of the Computer Inquiries, which required providers of “enhanced 
services” to make available the transmission component underlying those 
services on a nondiscriminatory basis to competitors.48  However, firms 
operating outside the common carrier market for telephony — notably cable 
companies — were not subject to these rules.49  Such a bifurcated regulatory 
approach raised concerns. Some argued that, in the absence of a more active 
approach (like common carriage), cable companies and other firms not 
subject to strictures like “open access” would be free to “impose whatever 
conditions they desire[d] on their customers” and exert too much control 
over the content flowing through their networks.50  Others, however, voiced 
concerns around the need for achieving regulatory parity and fostering a 
competitive environment in what quickly became a rapidly growing 
market.51 
Regulators were thus presented with a clear policy choice: impose 
“open access” requirements on all broadband providers in an effort to assure 
parity that mirrored common carrier regulation, or implement a more 
minimalist approach to foster continued growth of the market.  The FCC 
ultimately opted for the latter path, and between 2002 and 2007 it developed, 
and successfully defended in court, a light-touch regulatory framework for 
every type of broadband Internet access service — cable, DSL, and mobile, 
 
 48.  See, e.g., James B. Speta, Handicapping the Race for the Last Mile?: A Critique of Open 
Access Rules for Broadband Platforms, 17 YALE J. ON REG. 39, 61–69 (2000) (discussing the 
regulatory treatment of these access services). 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  See Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End: Preserving the 
Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REV. 925, 927 (2001) (hereinafter 
End of End-to-End). 
 51.  See, e.g., Michael K. Powell, Chairman, FCC, The Great Digital Broadband Migration, 
Remarks before the Progress & Freedom Foundation (Dec. 8, 2000), http://transition.fcc.gov/ 
Speeches/Powell/2000/spmkp003.html (“Convergence is radically altering economic assumptions 
and underlying cost structures.  It is changing the game of capital formation and altering business 
models.  The culmination of these changes is what I am referring to by the Broadband Digital 
Migration.  The challenge for us is to make a similar leap from analog-rooted regulations to ones 
that are applicable and relevant to the digital environment.”). 
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among others.52  Numerous state legislatures have also acted by enacting or 
contemplating enactment of laws reflecting this policy preference.  Many of 
these laws serve to underscore the lack of jurisdiction over broadband 
services by their PUCs; others have focused on supporting or funding 
deployment of networks to unserved areas.53 
3.  VoIP Regulation 
Almost immediately after the 1996 Act was enacted, a coalition of 
telephone service providers petitioned the FCC seeking a declaratory ruling 
regarding the regulatory treatment of a new form of voice communications 
— VoIP.54  The complaint suggested that the new service was nothing more 
than a “telecommunications service” that should be regulated as a common 
carrier.55  This case presented for the first time the “fundamental question of 
whether a service provided over the Internet that appear[ed] functionally 
similar to a traditionally-regulated service should be subject to existing 
regulatory requirements.”56 
 
 52.  See In re Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable & Other 
Facilities, GN Docket No. 00-185, Declaratory Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 
F.C.C.R 4798 (released Mar. 15, 2002), aff’d Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet 
Serv., 545 U.S. 967 (2005); In re Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet 
over Wireline Facilities, CC Docket No. 02-33, Report and Order of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 
FCC Rcd. 14853 (released Sept. 23, 2005); In re Classification of Broadband Over Power Line 
Internet Access Serv. as an Info. Serv., WC Docket No. 06-10, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 
21 FCC Rcd. 13281 (released Nov. 7, 2006); In re Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for 
Broadband Access to the Internet Over Wireless Networks, WT Docket No. 07-53, Declaratory 
Ruling, 22 FCC Rcd. 5901 (released Mar. 23, 2007). 
 53.  See, e.g., Completing the Process, supra note 44 (providing an overview of recent state 
laws related to these efforts); see also Examining the Role, supra note 44. 
 54.  See In re The Provision of Interstate & Int’l Interexchange Telecomms. Serv. via the 
“Internet” by Non-Tariffed, Uncertified Entities, America’s Carriers Telecomm. Ass’n Petition for 
Declaratory Ruling, Special Relief, and Inst. of Rulemaking Against VocalTec, Inc.; Internet Tel. 
Co.; Third Planet Publ’g Inc.; Camelot Corp.; Quarterdeck Corp.; & Other Providers of Non-
tariffed, & Uncertified Interexchange Telecomm. Serv., FCC, RM No. 8775 (Mar. 4, 1995). 
 55.  The crux of the petition was that it was “not in the public interest to permit long-distance 
service to be given away, depriving those who must maintain the telecommunications infrastructure 
of the revenue to do so . . . nor [was] it in the public interest for these select telecommunications 
carriers to operate outside the regulatory requirements applicable to all other carriers.” Id.  See also 
Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, Report to Congress, 13 FCC Rcd. 11501, 11505 
(1998).  
 56.  See Kevin Werbach, Digital Tornado: The Internet and Telecommunications Policy, at 
28, (FCC Office of Plans & Policy, Working Paper No. 29, 1997), available at http://transition. 
fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/working_papers/oppwp29.pdf (hereinafter Digital Tornado). 
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In the absence of clear guidance (the FCC never acted on the petition), 
and since many saw this new service as a threat to the revenues that formed 
the basis of USF funding mechanisms,57 the states began to assess whether 
and how VoIP, in particular any localized elements of the service, might (or 
should) fit within their regulatory purview.58  The Minnesota PUC in 2003, 
for example, attempted to impose traditional “telephone company” 
regulations on a VoIP service offered by Vonage.  The FCC responded by 
preempting the PUC’s decision, reasoning that because VoIP service “cannot 
be separated into interstate and intrastate communications for compliance 
with Minnesota’s requirements without negating valid federal policies and 
rules,” the FCC would have sole authority to regulate VoIP service.59  In its 
order, the FCC held that it, and “not the state commissions, has the 
responsibility and obligation to decide whether certain regulations apply to 
[the Vonage service] and other IP-enabled services having the same 
capabilities.”60 
In combination with two other orders issued in 2004, the FCC had 
finally provided some clarity regarding the appropriate balance of regulatory 
federalism for the still emerging service. 61   After the Minnesota PUC 
unsuccessfully appealed the order in federal court,62 legislatures in well over 
 
 57.  See Robert Cannon, State Regulatory Approaches to VoIP: Policy, Implementation, and 
Outcome, 57 FED. COMM. L.J. 479, 492 (2005) (“If the policy objective is protection of revenue, 
then regulating anything that could be used as a substitute for that revenue source could be an 
appropriate approach/implementation.”). 
 58.  Digital Tornado, supra note 56, at 38 (noting that “If federal rules governing Internet 
telephony are problematic, state regulations seem even harder to justify” and that “there is a good 
argument that Internet services should be treated as inherently interstate.  The possibility that fifty 
separate state Commissions could choose to regulate providers of Internet telephony services within 
their state (however that would be defined), already may be exerting a chilling influence on the 
Internet telephony market.”). 
 59.  See Vonage Holdings Corporation, Petition for Declaratory Ruling Concerning an Order 
of the Minn. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 19 FCC Rcd. 22404, 22404–05 (2004). 
 60.  Id.  
 61. See Petition for Declaratory Ruling That Pulver.com’s Free World Dialup Is Neither 
Telecomms. Nor a Telecomms. Service, 19 FCC Rcd. 3307 (2004); Petition for Declaratory Ruling 
that AT&T’s Phone-to-Phone IP Telephony Services are Exempt from Access Charges, 19 FCC 
Rcd. 7457 (2004). 
 62.  Minn. Pub. Util. Comm’n v. FCC, 483 F.3d 570 (8th Cir. 2007).  The Court of Appeals 
for the Eighth Circuit sided with the FCC and upheld application of the so-called “impossibility 
exception,” which, under the 1934 Act, allows the FCC to “preempt state regulation of a service 
which would otherwise be subject to dual federal and state regulation where it is impossible or 
impractical to separate the service’s intrastate and interstate components, and the state regulation 
interferes with valid federal rules or policies.”  Id. at 576.  
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half of the states ultimately adopted laws that prohibit their PUCs from 
regulating VoIP service. 63   In addition, the FCC extended a number of 
additional obligations to VoIP providers, many of which mirrored duties 
traditionally required of basic telephone service providers. 64   However, 
despite opening a rulemaking proceeding in 2004, the FCC has yet to 
officially classify VoIP as either a heavily regulated “telecommunication 
service” or a lightly regulated “information service.”65 
C.  Impacts and Outcomes 
As has been documented extensively elsewhere, there is significant 
evidence to demonstrate a causal relationship between the implementation 
of a deregulatory model in each of these segments and increases in 
investment, competition, and innovation.66  These gains also coincided with 
 
 63.  See generally Completing the Process; Examining the Role, supra note 44. 
 64.  Among other things, the FCC now requires interconnected VoIP providers to provide 
E911 services, protect customer proprietary network information, comply with various disability 
access requirements, and make telephone numbers portable.  See In the Matter of Telephone 
Number Requirements for IP-Enabled Services Providers, 22 FCC Rcd. 19531 (2007); In the 
Matter of IP-Enabled Services, 22 FCC Rcd. 11275, 11283–91, ¶¶ 17-31 (2007); In the Matter of 
IP-Enabled Services, 22 FCC Rcd. 6927, 6954-57, ¶¶ 54-59 (2007); In the Matter of IP-Enabled 
Services, 20 FCC Rcd. 10245 (2005). 
 65.  See In the Matter of IP-Enabled Services, 19 FCC Rcd. 4863 (2004).  The FCC’s 2015 
Open Internet Order suggests that VoIP will remain subject to a minimalist regulatory regime.  
However, the Commission has given itself relatively broad authority to revisit the regulatory 
approach to IP-enabled services like VoIP in the future if the services are offered in a manner that 
is tantamount to an evasion of the FCC’s “open Internet protections.” 
 66.  See, e.g., James Speta, Deregulating Telecommunications in Internet Time, 61 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 1063, 1147 (2004) (assessing the pro-competitive impacts of preventing municipalities 
from entering communications markets); Thomas Hazlett et al., Sending the Right Signals: 
Promoting Competition through Telecommunications Reform, a Report to the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce (Sept. 2004), available at http://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/ 
files/reports/0410_telecommstudy.pdf (comparing and contrasting the regulatory frameworks for 
telephone and broadband services and finding that the exacting regulatory approach for the former 
would hinder, rather than advance, competition and innovation in the market for the latter) 
(“Sending the Right Signals”); Robert Crandall & Hal Singer, The Economic Impact of Broadband 
Investment, Broadband for America (Feb. 2010), available at http://www. 
broadbandforamerica.com/sites/default/themes/broadband/images/mail/broadbandforamerica_cra
ndall_singer_final.docx (finding that “In a largely deregulatory climate, broadband penetration 
skyrocketed to nearly sixty-five percent penetration by the end of the decade as absolute and 
quality-adjusted prices fell, and first-generation technologies — cable modem, DSL, and 3G 
wireless — individually covered approximately 90 percent of all U.S. households and collectively 
covered even more.” Id. at 1); Kevin A. Hassett & Robert J. Shapiro, Regulation and Investment: 
A Note on Policy Evaluation under Uncertainty, With an Application to FCC Title II Regulation of 
the Internet, Georgetown Center for Business & Public Policy (July 2015), available at 
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and fed into a fundamental transformation of consumer expectations for their 
communications services.  
Another indicator of the success of this regulatory approach is the key 
role it played in fostering the creation of an ecosystem of firms that spans 
discrete but related segments (i.e., ISPs, content providers, and device 
manufacturers).67  Unlike under common carriage, which for many years 
focused on preserving a narrow set of market conditions that tended to deter 
such collaboration,68 deregulation created the conditions under which such 
cross-sector partnerships could thrive.  In short, the bright lines that once 
separated discrete segments of the communications space — and that were 
once enforced by onerous rules implemented concurrently by the FCC and 
individual states — disappeared in response to minimalism.  This dynamic 
is best illustrated by the rapid evolution of the mobile broadband space. 
Cross-sector partnerships in the wireless space have long existed (e.g., 
between handset developers and service providers), but, for the most part, 
firms tended to focus on competing within their immediate market.69  Over 
the last few years, however, these lines have begun to blur and are 
increasingly disappearing, as a result of the rapid emergence of next 
generation wireless broadband services.  The rise of smartphones powered 
by operating systems that enable a universe of cutting-edge add-ons, the use 
of which can be monetized in many ways, along with the deployment of 
faster and more reliable mobile broadband networks has fundamentally 
altered the nature of competition and innovation in what is now an 
 
http://cbpp.georgetown.edu/sites/cbpp.georgetown.edu/files/Shapiro-regulation-investment-note-policy- 
evaluation-FCC-titleII-regulation-internet.pdf  (“Regulation and Investment”).   
 67.  See Connecting America: The National Broadband Plan, at 15–16, FCC (2010), 
available at http://download.broadband.gov/plan/national-broadband-plan.pdf (providing a more 
detailed conceptual definition of the ecosystem) (“National Broadband Plan”). 
 68.  The common carrier regulatory framework articulated in the Communications Act of 
1934 was, in many ways, the natural result of a policy choice made years before by regulators. 
Once it became clear that the market for providing telephone service was a natural monopoly — 
i.e., that the provision of telephony was optimally provided by a private firm with a large scale — 
it was incumbent upon federal and state policymakers to develop a regulatory framework that could 
effectively manage the dominant firm and ensure that it was able to meet its many service 
obligations.  In short, the common carrier framework that emerged in the early 20th century was 
shaped largely by market conditions and a desire to assure that consumers would have universal 
access to affordable telephone service.  For further discussion, see ROBERT BRITT HORWITZ, THE 
IRONY OF REGULATORY REFORM: THE DEREGULATION OF AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
99–102 (1989). 
 69.  See, e.g., Thomas Hazlett, Online Markets vs. Traditional Markets: Modular Confines of 
Mobile Networks: Are iPhones iPhony?, 19 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 67 (2011) (providing an overview 
of how the ecosystem has developed).   
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interconnected ecosystem.70  Numerous firms now compete across sectors 
for the attention — and dollars — of consumers as they seek to position 
themselves as the primary facilitator of the mobile experience.71 
This dynamic, which is evident throughout the broadband space, did not 
stem from a particular set of regulatory provisions or legal obligations. 
Rather, it evolved organically out of the conditions created and fostered by 
the minimalist approach to regulation enshrined in federal statutes and 
implemented by the FCC up until recently.72 
III.  Section 706, The States, and Broadband Regulation After 
Verizon 
Attempts to modify the regulatory framework for broadband began in 
the late 2000s. 73   A watershed moment came in 2008, when the FCC 
attempted to censure a broadband ISP for allegedly throttling data traffic 
from a peer-to-peer website.74  The FCC, however, was eventually rebuked 
by a federal appeals court, which noted that the Commission, according to 
its interpretation of the Communications Act, lacked authority to regulate 
 
 70.  See, e.g., Thomas Hazlett, David Teece & Leonard Waverman, Walled Garden Rivalry: 
The Creation of Mobile Network Ecosystems, George Mason Univ. Law and Econ. Research Paper 
Series 11–50 (Nov. 2011), available at http://www.law.gmu.edu/assets/files/publications/ 
working_papers/1150WalledGardenRivalry.pdf. 
 71.  The FCC’s 2015 Open Internet Order hinges on a fundamentally different view of how 
the ecosystem works, one that was first outlined in the 2010 Order and subsequently accepted by 
the D.C. Circuit in Verizon.  In particular, it views the “virtuous cycle” of innovation in the 
broadband ecosystem as being driven almost exclusively by firms at the edge of the network (e.g., 
content providers).  See 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 13 at ¶ 75. 
 72.  See, e.g., Seizing the Mobile Moment, supra note 36 (further discussing this dynamic in 
the wireless space). 
 73.  Previously, in 2005, the FCC adopted a non-binding policy statement that detailed four 
principles regarding consumer access to the Internet.  According to the statement, consumers were 
entitled to: (1) access the lawful content of their choice; (2) run applications and use services of 
their choice, subject to the needs of law enforcement; (3) connect their choice of legal devices that 
no not harm the network; and (4) competition among firms in the ecosystem.  See Appropriate 
Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, Policy Statement, 20 
FCC Rcd. 14986 (2005). 
 74.  See In the Matters of Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against 
Comcast Corporation for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications and Broadband Industry 
Practices Petition of Free Press et al. for Declaratory Ruling that Degrading an Internet Application 
Violates the FCC’s Internet Policy Statement and Does Not Meet an Exception for “Reasonable 
Network Management,” Memorandum Opinion & Order, 23 FCC Rcd. 13028 (2008) (citing to the 
2005 policy statement). 
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such behavior.75  After the court’s decision, the FCC attempted to develop a 
sturdier legal foundation upon which to build rules that could support 
Commission authority to enforce open Internet rules.  The result was its 2010 
open Internet order, which hinged on a new interpretation of section 706 as 
the primary enabler of more active regulation of broadband service.76  This 
new interpretation, which was echoed in its most recent attempt to implement 
open Internet rules, has had broad ramifications.  This section examines the 
evolution of these changes and evaluates how the FCC’s new regulatory 
framework for broadband impacts the states. 
A.  Changing Course: A New Interpretation of Section 706(a) 
Administrative agencies like the FCC are allowed to change their minds 
subject to certain limitations.77  As the Supreme Court noted recently, to 
substantiate a revised interpretation of its enabling statute or a change in 
policy, an agency must “provide reasoned explanation for its action.”78  
Specifically, the Court stated: “it suffices that the new policy is permissible 
under the statute, that there are good reasons for it, and that the 
agency believes it to be better, which the conscious change of course 
adequately indicates. This means that the agency need not always provide a 
more detailed justification than what would suffice for a new policy created 
on a blank slate.”79  However, there are cases that do require a “more detailed 
justification.”  According to the Court, agencies “must” provide such an 
explanation when its “new policy rests upon factual findings that contradict 
those which underlay its prior policy” or “when its prior policy has 
engendered serious reliance interests that must be taken into account.”80 
In 2010, the FCC, in the context of its open Internet rulemaking, 
revisited its initial interpretation of section 706. 81   According to the 
Commission’s “present understanding,” this section “authorizes the 
Commission (along with state commissions) to take actions, within their 
 
 75.  Comcast v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 76.  2010 Open Internet Order, supra note 2. 
 77.  See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 863 (1984) (“An initial agency 
interpretation is not instantly carved in stone.”); NCTA v. Brand X, 545 U.S. 967 (2005). 
 78.  FCC v. Fox, 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009). 
 79.  Id. at 503. 
 80.  Id. at 515. See also Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Association, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 191 L. Ed. 
2d 186 (2015) (slip op. at 13) (clarifying that such changes require the relevant administrative 
agency to “provide more substantial justification.”). 
 81.  1998 Advanced Services Order, supra note 7, at 24047. 
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subject matter jurisdiction and not inconsistent with other provisions of law, 
that encourage the deployment of advanced telecommunications capability 
by any of the means listed in the provision.”82  To reiterate the primacy of 
this new “understanding,” the FCC took the additional step of underscoring 
that this new reading prevailed over any other, noting in a footnote that, “[t]o 
the extent the [1998 order] can be construed as having read Section 706(a) 
differently, we reject that reading of the statute.” 83   In addition, the 
Commission offered a detailed analysis of the legislative history of section 
706(a), concluding that it, combined with the actual text of the statute, 
represented “specific delegation of legislative authority to promote the 
deployment of advanced services.”84 
The FCC also acknowledged that its new authority under section 706(a) 
was not “limitless.” 85   On the contrary, the FCC identified several 
limitations.  First, its authority “does not . . . extend beyond [its] subject 
matter jurisdiction under the Communications Act” (i.e., interstate 
communications by wire or radio).  Second, its “actions under Section 706(a) 
must “encourage the deployment on a reasonable and timely basis of 
advanced telecommunications capability to all Americans.”  “And third, “the 
activity undertaken to encourage such deployment must” use the regulatory 
tools specifically identified in the law.86 
(In a subsequent order issued in an unrelated proceeding in 2011, the 
Commission further clarified that section 706(a) and section 706(b) operate 
independently of one another.87  Section 706(b), which does not implicate 
the states, provides the Commission with “additional authority, beyond what 
the Commission possesses under section 706(a) or elsewhere in the Act, to 
take steps necessary to fulfill Congress’s broadband deployment 
objectives.”88  This nuance was affirmed by a federal appeals court in June 
2014.89) 
In its review of the 2010 open Internet rules, the D.C. Circuit struck 
down major elements of the FCC’s order, but upheld this new reading of 
 
 82.  2010 Open Internet Order, supra note 2, at 17969. 
 83.  Id. at 17969. 
 84.  Id. at 17971. 
 85.  Id. at 17970. 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  See In the Matter of Connect America Fund, Report and Order and Further Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking, 26 FCC Rcd. 17663 (2011) (“Connect America Order”). 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  See In re FCC 11-161, 753 F.3d at 1049–54. 
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section 706(a).  The court accepted the Commission’s decision to eschew 
previous interpretations and embrace a reading that operates as an 
independent grant of authority to regulate broadband.90  In particular, the 
court found reasonable the FCC’s various reasons for making this change, 
observing that the analysis of the “statute’s text, its legislative history, and 
the resultant scope of the Commission’s authority” left it with “no basis” for 
denying its “changed interpretation.”91 
In anticipating arguments that this new reading might leave the FCC 
with “boundless” ability to regulate broadband, the court accepted two 
important limitations to the new authority wielded by the FCC.92 These 
limiting principles are: 
 
1. The FCC cannot use section 706 to expand the reach of its 
authority beyond historical limits: “the section must be read in 
conjunction with other provisions of the Communications Act, 
including, most importantly, those limiting the Commission’s 
subject matter jurisdiction to ‘interstate and foreign 
communication by wire and radio.’”93 
 
2. “[A]ny regulations must be designed to achieve a particular 
purpose: to ‘encourage the deployment on a reasonable and timely 
basis of advanced telecommunications capability to all 
Americans.’”94  As the court noted, the FCC was thus limited to 
“promulgat[ing] only those regulations that it establishes will 
fulfill this specific statutory goal — a burden that . . . is not 
meaningless.”95  In the context of open Internet rules, the court 
accepted the FCC’s argument that its rules were necessary to 
 
 90.  Verizon, 740 F. 3d at 636. 
 91.  Id. at 637. 
 92.  Id. at 639–40 (“We are satisfied that the scope of authority granted to the Commission by 
section 706(a) is not so boundless as to compel the conclusion that Congress could never have 
intended the provision to set forth anything other than a general statement of policy.  The 
Commission has identified at least two limiting principles inherent in section 706(a).”  (citations 
omitted)). 
 93.  Id. at 640. 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  Id. (internal citations omitted).  
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preserve the “virtuous cycle” of investment and innovation in the 
broadband space.96 
 
The court also addressed concerns about whether mention of state PUCs 
might somehow negate the FCC’s new interpretation of section 706(a) as an 
independent grant of regulatory authority over broadband.  For example, the 
court mentioned that “reference to state commissions [in the statute] does 
not foreclose” the FCC’s new reading.97  Although the court did not enter 
into an extended analysis of this point, it did refute arguments that “Congress 
would not be expected to grant both the FCC and state commissions the 
regulatory authority to encourage the deployment of advanced 
telecommunications capabilities.”98  In doing so, it noted in passing that 
“Congress has granted regulatory authority to state telecommunications 
commissions on other occasions, and we see no reason to think that it could 
not have done the same here.”99  Interestingly, the court, in support of this 
assertion, cited to a Supreme Court case from 1999 that held that the FCC 
possesses significant “power and responsibility to dictate the manner in 
which state commissions exercise such authority.”100  As discussed in more 
detail below, this highlights a critical limitation on potential new authority 
for PUCs to regulate broadband Internet access services. 
B. Further Guidance: The 2015 Open Internet Rules, and FCC 
Preemption of State Laws Impacting Municipal Broadband 
Deployment 
Approximately one year after Verizon, the FCC adopted a pair of orders 
that provided some additional guidance about the actual contours of section 
706 authority for the states.  Although both orders were subsequently 
challenged in court, they nevertheless provide key insights into how the FCC 
views the balance of regulatory federalism in this new era of more expansive 
broadband regulation.101 
 
 96.  Id. at 644–45. 
 97.  Id. at 638. 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  Id. (citing to AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. at 385-386).  
 101.  See U.S. Telecom Assoc. v. FCC, No. 15–1063 (D.C. Cir.) (challenging the legality of 
core aspects of the FCC’s open Internet order); Tennessee v. FCC, No. 15-3291 (6th Cir.) 
(challenging FCC preemption of state law limiting the expansion of municipal broadband 
networks).  
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In its 2015 Open Internet Order, the FCC included a nearly categorical 
prohibition of state level regulation of broadband services.  In “reaffirm[ing] 
[its] longstanding conclusion that broadband Internet access service is 
jurisdictionally interstate for regulatory purposes,” the FCC forcefully 
underscored that a key characteristic of the Internet is its “global” nature, one 
that makes it “impossible or impractical” to clearly identify separable 
intrastate and interstate components of it.102  However, the FCC did not 
assert exclusive regulatory jurisdiction over the service. Instead, it only 
reiterated that it would “guard against” state regulation of broadband that 
“conflict[s]” with its approach.103  Such “conflict preemption” has deep roots 
in the telecommunications space, as well as in other areas of regulatory law, 
and, theoretically, allows for at least some level of state regulation.104 
The order did note that “states of course have a role with respect to 
broadband.”105  Without referring to the exhortation in section 706 — that 
the FCC and state PUCs “shall encourage” broadband deployment — the 
order acknowledged the existence of several explicit grants or reservations 
of authority to the states that might have been unlocked as a result of 
reclassification. 106   Whether and how the FCC might reconcile its 
preemption pledge with this concession about the likely existence of at least 
some regulatory authority for the states remains to be seen.107 
In a related decision made on the same day as the open Internet ruling, 
the FCC applied its new interpretation of section 706 in the context of 
 
 102.  2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 13, at ¶ 431. 
 103.  Id. See also Id. at ¶ 433 (“. . . we announce our firm intention to exercise our preemption 
authority to preclude states from imposing obligations on broadband service that are inconsistent 
with the carefully tailored regulatory scheme we adopt in this Order .  .  . The Commission has used 
preemption to protect federal interests when a state regulation conflicts with federal rules or 
policies, and we intend to exercise this authority to preempt any state regulations which conflict 
with this comprehensive regulatory scheme or other federal law.” (citations omitted)).   
 104.  See, e.g., Federalism in Transition, supra note 11 (discussing the contours of federal 
preemption and state regulation in the context of basic telephone service). 
 105.  2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 13, at ¶ 431, fn. 1276. See also ¶ 276, n. 708 (noting 
that the “Commission’s interpretation does not preclude all state commission action in this area, 
just that which is inconsistent with the federal regulatory regime we adopt today.” (citations 
omitted)). 
 106.  See, e.g., Id. at ¶ 531 (making clear that the FCC was not forbearing from specific 
provisions of the Communications Act “insofar as they merely reserve state authority”).  These 
specific grants and reservations of authority are discussed in more detail infra. 
 107.  The FCC says that it will “act promptly” to address these issues, engaging in a “case-by-
case” approach to “prevent state regulations that would conflict with the federal regulatory 
framework or otherwise frustrate federal broadband policies.”  Id. at ¶ 433. 
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municipal broadband.  Responding to two petitions seeking preemption of 
state laws that limited the ability of municipal ISPs to expand their networks, 
the FCC found the laws to be “barriers to infrastructure investment” and thus 
in “conflict with the federal policy set out in section 706.”108  This action, 
while nominally limited to state laws impacting existing municipal 
broadband networks, was revealing of how the Commission — and 
potentially the states — might apply section 706 going forward. 109   In 
particular, the FCC put forward a rather open-ended reading of Congress’s 
“unique level of . . . concern with broadband deployment,” seeming to 
justify a liberal interpretation of what the amorphous phrase “other 
regulating methods” included in section 706(a) might mean.110  Indeed, the 
FCC appears to view this provision as a catchall that encompasses the array 
of “regulatory tools” that entities like the Commission have long availed 
themselves of in the regulation of telecommunications services.111  As such, 
the possibility exists that a state PUC could attempt to adapt this same logic 
when justifying a regulatory action aimed at an entirely intrastate element of 
broadband deployment.112 
When read together, some might argue that these two initial 
applications of the FCC’s new interpretation of section 706 appear to provide 
at least some theoretical room for the states to explore the outer limits of 
whatever regulatory authority they might have over broadband. Even though 
both orders go to great lengths to underscore the willingness of the FCC to 
preempt state actions — regulation and legislation — that it deems 
inconsistent with federal policy prerogatives for broadband and other 
advanced communications services, there is little guidance about what, if 
any, limits the Commission might place on its analysis of the interstate nature 
of broadband.113  The 2015 Open Internet Order’s acknowledgement that the 
Communications Act contains an array of specific grants or reservations of 
authority over telecommunications services to the states suggests a largely 
 
 108.  See In the Matter of City of Wilson, North Carolina Petition for Preemption of North 
Carolina General Statute Sections 160A-340 et seq., Memorandum Opinion & Order, at ¶ 10, 30 
FCC Rcd. 2408, WC Docket No. 14-115, FCC 15-25 (rel. Mar. 12, 2015) (“2015 Preemption 
Order”).  
 109.  Id. at ¶ 11. 
 110.  Id. at ¶ 135. 
 111.  Id. at ¶ 144. 
 112.  See infra, Section III.D, for further discussion.  
 113.  See, e.g., Christopher S. Yoo, Wickard for the Internet? Network Neutrality After Verizon 
v. FCC, 66 FED. COMM. L. J. 415, 427 (2014) (analogizing this approach to a Supreme Court case 
that “opened the door to an expansion of the commerce power such that left few activities outside 
its scope”  (citation omitted) (“Wickard for the Internet”).  
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hands-off application of this standard.  This could invite some state 
experimentation, possible examples of which are discussed in the next 
section and evaluated in section III.D. 
C. Proposed Applications of Section 706(a) at the State Level 
Since Verizon, there have been several attempts to decipher what the 
FCC’s new interpretation and recent applications of section 706(a) actually 
means in practice for state PUCs. 
First, PUCs in California and New York both cited to section 706(a) as 
a basis for expanding the scope of their review of proposed transactions 
involving ISPs to encompass broadband.  During reviews of two recent 
mergers — first, the proposed (and ultimately abandoned) merger of 
Comcast and Time Warner Cable, and subsequently the merger of Charter 
Communications and Time Warner Cable — as well as the proposed sale of 
broadband lines from Verizon to Frontier, these PUCs have attempted or 
been urged to use section 706(a) as a means of circumventing state laws 
limiting the scope of their review to considering only the impacts of the 
transaction specifically on basic telephone and cable service.114 
The California PUC, for example, argued in the context of the Comcast-
Time Warner Cable merger that the “affirmative grant of authority” under 
section 706(a) does not run afoul of state law and indeed compels it to 
“examine the implications of the merger on broadband deployment” in the 
state. 115   Similarly, staff at the New York PUC, in reviews of both 
 
 114.  See CA Pub. Utils. Code § 710; Joint Petition of Time Warner Cable, Inc. and Comcast 
Corporation for Approval of a Holding Company Level Transfer of Control, Comments of the NY 
State Department of Public Service Staff, at 11–16, Case 14–M–0183, NY PSC (Aug. 8, 2014), 
available at http://documents.dps.ny.gov/public/Common/ViewDoc.aspx?DocRefId= 
{0A5EAC88-6AB7-4F79-862C-B6C6B6D2E4ED} (discussing the standard of review to be used 
by the PSC in the context of its review of the proposed merger) (“New York PSC Staff Comments”); 
Joint Petition of Charter Communications and Time Warner Cable for Approval of a Transfer of 
Control of Subsidiaries and Franchises, Pro Forma Reorganization, and Certain Financing 
Arrangements, Redacted Comments of the NY State Dep’t of Pub. Service Staff, at 12, CASE 15-
M-0388 (Sept. 16, 2015), available at http://documents.dps.ny.gov/public/Common/ 
ViewDoc.aspx?DocRefId={C60985CC-BEE8-43A7-84E8-5A4B4D8E0F54} (“Redacted 
Comments”).  
 115.  See Joint Application of Comcast Corp., Time Warner Cable Inc., Time Warner Cable 
Information Services (CA), LLC, and Bright House Networks Information Services (CA), LLC for 
Expedited Approval of the Transfer of Control of Time Warner Cable Information Services (CA), 
LLC (U6874C); and the Pro Forma Transfer of Control of Bright House Networks Information 
Services (CA), LLC (U6955C), to Comcast Corp. Pursuant to CA Pub. Utils. Code Section 854(a), 
Scoping Memo and Ruling of Assigned Comm’r and Administrative Law Judge, at 10-12, 
Application 14-04-013 (Aug. 14, 2014), available at http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/ 
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transactions, interpreted Verizon to mean that it is “obligated,” according to 
the “clear Federal mandate” included in section 706(a), to “consider the 
impact of broadband on the proposed transaction in New York State.”116  In 
the context of its review of the Verizon-Frontier sale, the California PUC 
was asked to use section 706(a) as a way of expanding the scope of review 
to consider the impacts of the transaction on broadband and VoIP service in 
the state.117 
Second, there have been several interpretations of Verizon that suggest 
that states could use section 706(a), either alone or in combination with other 
authority (e.g., common carrier authority stemming from reclassification), to 
expand their general regulatory purview to encompass various aspects of 
broadband and IP-enabled services.118  The following provides a summary 
of several such analyses. 
 
 Pole Attachments.  One early analysis suggested that an area ripe for 
PUC intervention in furtherance of the mandate included in section 
706(a) is to rationalize the processes by which pole attachments are 
administered.119  In particular, this analysis argued that section 706 
 
Efile/G000/M101/K123/101123512.PDF.  See also Joint Application of Comcast Corp., Time 
Warner Cable Inc., Time Warner Cable Information Services (CA), LLC, and Bright House 
Networks Information Services (CA), LLC for Expedited Approval of the Transfer of Control of 
Time Warner Cable Information Services (CA), LLC (U6874C); and the Pro Forma Transfer of 
Control of Bright House Networks Information Services (California), LLC (U6955C), to Comcast 
Corporation Pursuant to California Public Utilities Code Section 854(a), Proposed Decision, at 
18–21, Application 14-04-013 (Feb. 13, 2015), available at http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/ 
PublishedDocs/Efile/G000/M146/K376/146376008.PDF (largely accepting this interpretation).  
 116.  NY PSC Staff Comments at 10; Redacted Comments at 12–13.  
 117.  See, e.g., In the Matter of the Joint Application of Frontier Commc’n Corp., Frontier 
Communications Of America, Inc. (U 5429 C), Verizon CA Inc. (U 1002 C), Verizon Long Distance, 
LLC (U 5732 C), And Newco West Holdings LLC for Approval of Transfer of Control Over Verizon 
CA Inc. and Related Approval of Transfer of Assets and Certifications, Protest of the Office of 
Ratepayer Advocates to Frontier/Verizon Joint Application for Approval of Transfer of Control 
and Related Approval of Transfer of Assets and Certifications, at 5–6, A.15-03-005 (Mar. 18, 
2015), available at http://www.tellusventure.com/downloads/frontier/ora_protest_ frontier 
_verizon_27apr2015.pdf.  
 118.  See, e.g., Tejas N. Narechania, Federal and State Authority for Network Neutrality and 
Broadband Regulation, 18 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 456, 485 (2015) (“Stated simply, section 706 
contains a significant grant of authority to state commissions.”) (“Federal and State Authority”); 
Wickard for the Internet at 446–47 (noting that while “the statute . . . seems to accord state PUCs 
the same regulatory authority that it accords to the FCC,” there is significant evidence in the 
legislative history of the 1996 Telecommunications Act to suggest that the “federal government 
should be able to preempt state regulation notwithstanding the language of section 706(a)”).   
 119.  Federal and State Authority at 485−90.  
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would provide PUCs with “the authority necessary to extend pole 
attachment rights to broadband providers” should the FCC decline to 
do so or if states “opt out of the federal pole attachment scheme.”120  
The FCC addressed this issue in its 2015 open Internet order and 
extended the prevailing federal-state regulatory regime for pole 
attachments to cover broadband services. 121   In its analysis, the 
Commission noted that relying just on section 706 for this change was 
inadequate.122  Instead, “section 224 [of the Communications Act] and 
[other] implementing regulations [included in the order] provide a more 
certain foundation” for creating a leveler playing field vis-à-vis 
accessing poles in the deployment of broadband networks. 123  
Continuing forward with this regime could present challenges to 
broadband deployment because, in recent years, there has been a move 
toward greater federal guidance of what can be a byzantine system of 
building wireline and wireless broadband networks.124  Whether more 
individualized state action in this context would truly result in removal 
of barriers to broadband deployment remains to be seen.125 
 
 Universal Service.  Another analysis suggests that section 254 of the 
Communications Act might supplement new authority stemming from 
section 706.126  Section 254 concerns universal service and provides the 
FCC and state PUCs with broad discretion to “preserve and advance” 
it.127  On its face, the two statutory mandates seem to work together — 
both are focused on facilitating broader broadband deployment via 
concurrent federal and state action. Indeed, section 254 explicitly 
 
 120.  Id. at 487.  See also 47 U.S.C. § 224 (detailing the federal and state level regulatory 
regime for pole attachments).  
 121.  See 2015 Open Internet Order at ¶¶ 478-485. 
 122.  Id. at ¶ 485.  
 123.  Id.  
 124.  See, e.g., Shot Clock Order (providing guidance in the context of wireless siting at the 
state level); In the Matter of Implementation of Section 224 of the Act, Report and Order and Order 
on Reconsideration, 26 FCC Rcd. 5240 (Apr. 7, 2011) (providing guidance for the thirty states that 
have not opted out of the federal system for pole attachments). 
 125.  For further discussion, see infra, section III.D. 
 126.  See Mark Cooper, Decision Making in the Face of Complex Ambiguity: Mapping the 
FCC’s Route to the Broadband Network Compact, at 17–18, Consumer Federation of America 
(Mar. 2014), available at http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/MAPPING-A-ROUTE-TO-THE-
BROADBAND-NETWORK-COMPACT.pdf.  
 127.  47 U.S.C. § 254. 
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allows states to adopt universal service rules “not inconsistent” with the 
FCC’s rules.128  Prior to Verizon, the FCC acted to include broadband 
as a supported service in the federal universal service scheme; in doing 
so, it preempted some state authority over various aspects of universal 
service. 129   In addition, the FCC, in its 2015 open Internet order, 
preempted states from imposing any new state universal service 
contribution requirements on broadband (although it indicated that it 
may revisit this determination in the future).130  Yet under a dual section 
706/section 254 regime, a state PUC could attempt to attach new non-
contribution-based universal service obligations, rationalizing that they 
are essential to meeting the goals of section 706(a).  Such an outcome 
might undermine or contradict state legislative attempts to relieve 
broadband providers of those obligations and otherwise develop a more 
modern and streamlined approach to broadband deployment.131 
 
 Broad PUC Authority.  Yet another analysis suggests that the full power 
of section 706, as wielded by both the FCC and state PUCs, will be 
realized as a result of reclassification of broadband as a common carrier 
service. 132   According to this view, the transmission component of 
broadband service is so essential to consumers and to other industries, 
including those that provide critical infrastructure services, that the only 
way to protect against degraded service and uphold a high level of 
connectivity is to treat broadband in a manner similar to public 
utilities.133  With regard to state level regulation, this analysis suggests 
that the ability of individual PUCs to act in a manner that furthers 
 
 128.  47 U.S.C. § 254(f).  
 129.  Connect America Order, aff’d sub nom., In re FCC 11–161, 753 F.3d 1015 (10th Cir. 
2014). 
 130.  2015 Open Internet Order at ¶ 432.  The FCC also decided to forbear from enforcing 
certain elements of section 254 — parts of subsections (d), (g), and (k).  Id. at ¶ 486.  However, the 
Commission also recognized that “section 254 expressly contemplates that states will take action 
to preserve and advanced universal service” and noted that it “will benefit from further 
deliberation” on the permissible scope of those actions. Id. at ¶ 490, n. 1476.  
 131.  For examples of recent state legislative efforts, see supra, section II.  See also Completing 
the Process; Examining the Role.  
 132.  See Written Statement of Commissioner Catherine J.K. Sandoval, CA PUC, Before the 
Congressional Forum on Net Neutrality, Sept. 24, 2014, available at http://democrats. 
energycommerce.house.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Testimony-Sandoval-CT-Net-Neutrality-
Forum-2014-9-24.pdf (“Sandoval Testimony”). 
 133.  Id.  The core findings of the FCC’s 2015 Open Internet Order agree with much of this 
reasoning.  
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federal and state statutory obligations vis-à-vis core public utilities like 
providers of electricity, gas, water, and basic telephone service might 
be compromised without this kind of authority.134  The analysis argues 
that this could happen given the increasing interdependence of utility 
service with advanced communications networks (e.g., electric and 
water utilities using broadband to deploy mission-critical “smart grid” 
services).135  In addition to supporting reclassification in an effort to 
bolster PUC authority over broadband service, this analysis also 
recommended that the FCC coordinate more closely with the Federal-
State Joint Conference on Advanced Services and “ask state members, 
many of whom have responsibility for oversight of various Critical 
Infrastructure sectors, to weigh in on this proposal [for new broadband 
regulations] and its implications for utility service.”136 
 
Third, some service providers are also exploring whether and how 
section 706(a) might relate to their businesses.  For example, one firm 
attempted to argue that this section compels a state PUC to actively intervene 
in disputes implicating broadband service.  This case, which arose in 
Tennessee, revolved around a dispute between a competitive telephone 
provider and a municipal entity that provides communications services to 
businesses and residents. 137   For many years, the two entities worked 
together, with the municipal provider leasing the competitive carrier access 
to its telephone transmission facility. 138   However, once that agreement 
ended, the municipal provider refused to renew or to consider further 
requests for providing similar wholesale access to its broadband facilities.139  
Citing section 706, the competitive company argued that the municipal 
provider is “require[d] . . . to offer competitors access to its broadband 
transmission facilities.”140   Moreover, the competitive carrier interpreted 
 
 134.  Id. at 31−41. 
 135.  Id. 
 136.  Id. at 46.  The 2015 Open Internet Order did not heed these recommendations.   
 137.  See Complaint of Aeneas Communications LLC Against Jackson Energy Authority, 
Docket No. 14–00070, TENN. REGULATORY AUTH. (Jul. 8, 2014), http://share.tn.gov/tra/ 
dockets/1400070.htm. 
 138.  Id. at 2. 
 139.  Id. 
 140.  Id. 
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Verizon to mean that section 706 compels such access so long as it is made 
“upon ‘commercially reasonable’ terms and conditions.”141 
In response, the municipal provider argued that this reading of the case 
is erroneous, noting that, “there is no uniform federal law requiring [it] to 
offer competitors access to its broadband transmission facilities.  The FCC 
has not taken any steps to do [sic] promulgate rules or delegate jurisdiction 
to the [Tennessee PUC] to regulate broadband services under the federal 
Telecommunications Act, and section 706(a) does not provide any free-
standing jurisdiction to the [PUC] to promulgate such rules on its own.”142  
The municipal provider also argued that granting the requested relief would 
not “fulfill the statutory goal” of section 706(a), which is to “further 
development of additional advanced telecommunications networks.”143  The 
case was officially docketed in October 2014;144 a year later, the docket was 
closed upon withdrawal of the complaint.145 
Fourth, another example of how private firms are attempting to wield 
section 706 to advance their interests arose in the context of television 
programming.  In April 2015, the American Cable Association (“ACA”), on 
behalf of its membership of independent video and broadband service 
providers, called on the FCC to use section 706 to “combat” the surging cost 
of programming, which, in its view, “inhibit[s] broadband investment that 
would expand competitive choice and initiate new service.”146  The tie-in to 
broadband is indirect: according to the ACA, “video programming . . . [is] 
one of the key services provided over a network offering advanced 
telecommunications capability (broadband).”147  The relief requested by the 
 
 141.  Id. at 3.  
 142.  See Complaint of Aeneas Commc’n, LLC Against Jackson Energy Authority, Jackson 
Energy Authority Motion to Dismiss and Motion in Opposition to Commencement of a Contested 
Case, at 2, Docket No. 14-00070, TENN. REGULATORY AUTH. (Aug. 7, 2014), available at 
http://share.tn.gov/tra/orders/2014/1400070d.pdf.  
 143.  Id. at 3.  
 144.  See Complaint of Aeneas Commc’n, LLC Against Jackson Energy Authority, Order 
Appointing a Hearing Officer, Docket No. 14-00070, TENN. REGULATORY AUTH. (Oct. 16, 2014), 
available at http://share.tn.gov/tra/orders/2014 /1400070l.pdf.   
 145.  See Complaint of Aeneas Commc’n, LLC Against Jackson Energy Authority, Order 
Closing Docket, TENN. REGULATORY AUTH. (Oct. 27, 2015), available at http://share.tn. 
gov/tra/orders/2014/1400070t.pdf.  
 146.  See Press Release, American Cable Ass’n, ACA To FCC: Use Sec. 706 To Curb Surging 
Programming Costs Inhibiting Broadband Investment, (Apr. 7, 2015), http://www. 
americancable.org/node/5261. 
 147.  See In the Matter of Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecomm. 
Capability to All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate 
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ACA revolves primarily around reforms to existing program access and 
retransmission rules, which, it argues, are necessary to lower the barriers to 
entry into the broadband space for smaller companies that lack the financial 
resources and scale often wielded by larger MVPDs (which also offer 
broadband services) in negotiations with content companies.148  Potential 
action by state PUCs, which traditionally have not had any role in 
programming disputes,149 was raised by the ACA in passing, noting that the 
national lobby group for state regulators had previously endorsed referring 
such reform questions to the Federal-State Joint Conference on Advanced 
Services.150  Whether the FCC will act on this request by the ACA remains 
to be seen. 
D. Limitations and Complications in the Application of Section 706(a) by 
State PUCs 
Taken together, the 2015 open Internet order, FCC preemption of state 
laws impacting municipal broadband deployment, and the various analyses 
discussed in the previous section highlight lingering uncertainty about the 
extent to which section 706(a) might be applicable at the state level.  Indeed, 
rather than answering the question of how section 706 might empower the 
states to regulate broadband, these various activities mostly succeed in 
identifying a range of more nuanced questions about the real reach of this 
provision: 
 
 Does the perceived regulatory authority pursuant to section 706(a) 
trump state laws that might preclude particular actions? 
 
Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecomms. Act of 1996, as Amended by the 
Broadband Data Improvement Act, Comments of the ACA, at 1, GN Docket No. 14-126 (Mar. 6, 
2015), available at http://www.americancable.org/files/150306%20ACA%20706%20 
Comments%20Final. pdf.  
 148.  See generally id.  (stating that the ACA focuses its comments on actions that “remove 
barriers to infrastructure investment and encourage more expansive and more rapid deployment of 
networks that can provide advanced telecommunications capability to encourage investment by 
small- and medium-sized providers in networks that would provide this capability”). 
 149.  See 47 U.S.C.A. § 544 (f) (West) (explaining that Federal law greatly limits state PUC 
authority by statute). 
 150.  See Nat’l Ass’n of Regulatory Util. Comm’rs (NARUC), Resolution on Fair and Non-
Discriminatory Access to Content, at 1, (Feb. 16 2011), available at http://www.naruc.org/ 
Resolutions/Resolution%20on%20Fair%20and%20Non%20Discriminatory%20Access%20to%2
0Content.pdf (urging the FCC to refer the matter to the Section 706 Joint Conference for 
examination and recommendations). 
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 In states that have not explicitly addressed broadband, wireless, or IP-
enabled services via legislation, to what extent does section 706(a) 
enlarge the scope of PUC authority over these services? 
 What is the range of appropriate actions that PUCs might engage in vis-
à-vis encouraging broadband deployment? 
 How might FCC and judicial precedent on related issues impact state 
efforts to regulate broadband? 
 How does reclassification of broadband as a “telecommunications 
service” subject to common carrier regulation impact the analysis? 
Answering these questions and developing a framework for rationally 
interpreting section 706 requires an understanding of the many limitations 
and complications arising from the interplay of the new interpretation of this 
section with existing federal and state law, FCC precedent, case law, and 
other factors.  These are discussed in turn below. 
1. Limitations 
As previously noted, the FCC’s new interpretation of section 706 has 
invited numerous proposals for state PUC intervention into the broadband 
space.  As discussed in detail below, these proposals evince a shallow 
understanding of the legal, regulatory, and public policy dynamics that, in 
practice, ought to preclude any decision by a state PUC to regulate 
broadband or specific IP-enabled services.  Indeed, when read in light of 
established legal precedent, related FCC action, and federal and state laws 
regarding the regulation of advanced communications services like VoIP, the 
strongest interpretation is that the actual scope of PUC authority under 
section 706 is very narrow and subject to an array of limitations, including 
federal preemption. 
One major limitation on state PUC authority to regulate broadband 
under section 706(a) stems from the text of the statute itself.  The Supreme 
Court has famously said of the 1996 Telecommunications Act that it “would 
be gross understatement to say that [it] is not a model of clarity.  It is in many 
important respects a model of ambiguity or indeed even self-
contradiction.”151  In the context of possible state regulation of advanced 
communications services like broadband, the Act appears to contradict itself.  
While section 706(a) appears to unlock regulatory authority for states, 
several other sections counsel against burdening the Internet with regulation 
 
 151.  AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. at 397. 
4 SANTORELLI-DAVIDSON ARTICLE_FINAL_TOM_GS_NW_MK.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/19/2016  3:08 PM 
242 HASTINGS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 8:2 
 
and empower the FCC to preempt state regulatory actions that are 
inconsistent with the Act and the Commission’s interpretation of it.152 
The Act’s legislative history offers another limitation on state 
regulatory activity.  The Congressional reports accompanying the bill that 
would eventually become the 1996 Telecommunications Act were mostly 
silent on whether section 706(a) conveys specific regulatory authority to 
state PUCs.  However, there are clues in various sections of these reports and 
related documents suggesting that any real authority flowing from section 
706(a) would be narrow and subject to preemption by the FCC.  Indeed, each 
of the reports provided by the House and Senate during negotiation of the 
bill contains blunt language about a core goal for the Act: to “provide for a 
pro-competitive, de-regulatory national policy framework designed to 
accelerate rapidly private sector deployment of advanced 
telecommunications and information.”153 
Another major limitation revolves around the ability of the FCC to 
shape PUC regulatory efforts vis-à-vis broadband.  In particular, there is 
substantial legal precedent supporting the FCC’s ability to dictate how PUCs 
interpret and apply provisions of the Act.  In the context of broadband 
regulation, state PUCs would not have carte blanche; rather, the vast 
majority of their efforts would likely be subject to federal preemption.  This 
stems from legal precedent granting administrative agencies like the FCC 
significant deference to not only interpret ambiguities in their enabling 
statutes, but, in the specific case of communications services, the ability to 
resolve those ambiguities in a more federally focused manner.154  Indeed, 
litigation in the aftermath of the 1996 Act made clear that the FCC retained 
 
 152.  See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2); Minn. Pub. Utils. Comm’n v. FCC, 483 F.3d at 576 
(explaining the ”impossibility exception,” which, according to 47 U.S.C. § 152(b), “allows the FCC 
to preempt state regulation of a service which would otherwise be subject to dual federal and state 
regulation where it is impossible or impractical to separate the service’s intrastate and interstate 
components, and the state regulation interferes with valid federal rules or policies”); see also supra 
note 13, at ¶ 433 (explaining that the Commission intends to exercise its authority to preempt any 
state regulations which conflict with this comprehensive regulatory scheme or other federal law). 
 153.  See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 104-458, at 1 (1996) (Conf. Rep.) (emphasis added); S. REP. NO. 
104-230, at 50-51 (1996) (Conf. Rep.). 
 154.  See, e.g., supra note 34, at 397 (“Congress is well aware that the ambiguities it chooses 
to produce in a statute will be resolved by the implementing agency.”  (citations omitted)); City of 
Arlington, Tex. v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013) (holding that courts should defer to an agency’s 
interpretation of its own jurisdiction so long as that interpretation is reasonable). 
4 SANTORELLI-DAVIDSON ARTICLE_FINAL_TOM_GS_NW_MK.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/19/2016  3:08 PM 
SUMMER 2016] BROADBAND, THE STATES, AND SECTION 706 243 
 
significant authority to direct PUC efforts vis-à-vis implementing sections of 
the law, including those that granted PUCs specific duties.155 
A related limitation stems from previous FCC action to rein in state 
attempts to regulate advanced communications services like VoIP and 
otherwise administer the national regulatory framework for advanced 
communications services like broadband.  As noted in section 2, there have 
been numerous instances where the FCC has acted to nullify state level 
regulatory action that it deemed inconsistent with its federally focused 
approach to advanced services.  Examples include FCC preemption of PUC 
attempts to regulate VoIP 156 ; FCC action to rationalize wireless siting 
rules157; and FCC efforts to modernize universal service policy.158  These 
actions have deep roots in the regulatory approach to advanced services that 
was developed and implemented in the late 1990s and early 2000s,159 which 
grew out of previous efforts to strike an effective balance of regulatory 
federalism in this space.160  In short, the FCC has a strong legal basis for 
preempting state PUC efforts impacting broadband services that it deems 
inconsistent with its preferred framework.161 
Finally, there are substantial limitations arising from the array of state 
laws impacting PUC regulation of communications services.  As noted 
previously, dozens of states have adopted laws expressly limiting, removing, 
or precluding the regulatory reach of PUCs vis-à-vis broadband, wireless 
telephony, and IP-enabled services like VoIP.162  Moreover, it is widely 
recognized that PUCs are nothing more than a “creature of the State,” 
 
 155.  See, e.g., supra note 34, at 384−386 (upholding the primacy of the FCC’s general 
rulemaking authority and its ability to “guide state-commission judgments”). 
 156.  See, e.g., supra note 62. 
 157.  See City of Arlington, Tex., 133 S. Ct. at 1863 (upholding the FCC’s Shot Clock Order). 
 158.  In re FCC 11-161, 753 F.3d 1015 (10th Cir. 2014) cert. denied sub nom. Cellular S., Inc. 
v. FCC, 135 S. Ct. 2050 (2015) and cert. denied sub nom. U.S. Cellular Corp. v. FCC, 135 S. Ct. 
2072 (2015) and cert. denied sub nom. Allband Commc’ns Co-op. v. FCC, 135 S. Ct. 2072 (2015) 
and cert. denied sub nom. Nat’l Ass’n of Regulatory Comm’rs v. FCC, 135 S. Ct. 2072 (2015). 
 159.  See supra, section II.B. 
 160.  See, e.g., Wickard for the Internet at 446 (discussing previous FCC action in the context 
of its Computer Inquiries to preempt state regulation of enhanced services); see also Federalism in 
Transition.  
 161.  See, e.g., 2015 Open Internet Order at ¶¶ 431-433 (reaffirming that broadband is 
“jurisdictionally interstate for regulatory purposes” and noting that it is ready to preempt state 
regulatory activity that it deems inconsistent with its “carefully tailored [Open Internet] regulatory 
scheme . . .”).   
 162.  See supra, section II; see also Completing the Process (providing an overview of recent 
efforts); Examining the Role, supra note 44. 
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meaning that they are mere creations of state legislatures.163  Consequently, 
“such ‘creatures’ quite simply have no authority to engage in activities 
unauthorized in their charters.”164  However, some have argued that state 
PUCs may be justified in engaging in such ultra vires actions because they 
are “exercise[ing] substantive federal power.”165  But, as discussed above, 
federal case law and FCC precedent suggest that, in the context of broadband 
regulation, PUC discretion would be extremely limited and subject to 
expansive checks by the Commission and the courts. 
2.  Complications 
As the preceding analysis demonstrates, state PUC authority to regulate 
broadband under section 706(a) is significantly circumscribed by a range of 
limiting factors.  However, this narrow scope hinged in large part on the 
classification of broadband as a lightly regulated “information service.”  
Reclassifying it as a “telecommunications service” subject to common 
carrier regulation under Title II of the Telecommunications Act appears to 
complicate this dynamic. 166   Indeed, reclassification could invite state 
attempts to regulate wireline and wireless broadband services as common 
carriers in a manner consistent with the dual federal-state framework that 
was long used for basic telephony, the service that Title II was originally 
developed to govern.167  State PUCs might also attempt to pull what they 
perceive as functionally equivalent services like VoIP into their regulatory 
orbit, even though these services remain lightly regulated at the federal 
 
 163.  See In the Matter of Petitions Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 
1996 for Removal of State Barriers to Broadband Investment and Competition, Reply Comments 
of NARUC, at 7, WC Docket No. 14-115 & 14-116 (Sept. 29, 2014), available at http://www. 
naruc.org/Filings/14%200929%20NARUC%20REPLY%20COMMENTS%20ON%20MUNICIP
AL%20BROADBAND%20PREEMPTION%20v2.pdf (“NARUC Comments”).  
 164.  Id. (emphasis in the original). 
 165.  See Federal and State Authority at 458.  See also Philip J. Weiser, Towards a 
Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative Federalism, 79 N.C. L. REV. 663 (2001). 
 166.  Analyzing the legality (or wisdom) of reclassification is beyond the scope of this paper.  
However, several observations are relevant here.  As previously noted, administrative agencies 
possess relatively broad latitude to alter or reverse previous interpretations and applications of their 
enabling statutes.  This ability, though, is not without its limits, especially in cases where entities 
relied on previous interpretations.  Such reliance concerns are compounded by the remarkable 
growth of the broadband sector under the previous light touch regulatory regime.  For further 
discussion, see supra, sections II.B & III.A. 
 167.  For a historical overview of this approach, see Federalism in Transition at 1138–47. 
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level.168  However, although arguments could be made in support of such 
state level regulatory interventions, the vast majority of these attempts would 
most likely trigger FCC preemption or otherwise fail when challenged in 
court. 
For example, even though the FCC’s reclassification of broadband was 
accompanied by forbearance of many provisions requiring or implicating 
some level of state regulation,169 the Communications Act includes a number 
of other explicit delegations or reservations of authority to the states, many 
of which arise in Title II.  As but one example, there has been some 
discussion regarding the extent to which reclassification might implicate 
traditional ratemaking authority by the FCC and state PUCs.170  Even though 
the FCC has stated that it has no intention of  regulating rates under sections 
201 and 202 at this point in time, PUCs could nevertheless attempt to argue 
that they are justified in ensuring that rates are “just and reasonable” pursuant 
to the Act. 171   These arguments could be bolstered by Supreme Court 
precedent that suggests that PUCs retain primary authority over intrastate 
ratemaking, as well as interconnection, of telecommunications services.172  
FCC and judicial precedent make clear that intrastate aspects of broadband 
networks and IP-enabled services like VoIP are essentially nonexistent,173 
but state PUCs could interpret reclassification of broadband as an invitation 
to revisit these earlier decisions or request that the FCC “unforbear” from its 
decision not to regulate rates.174  
 
 168.  2015 Open Internet Order at ¶ 207.  See also In the Matter of Technology Transitions, 
Ex Parte of NARUC, GN Docket No. 13-5 (Jul. 17, 2015) (arguing that reclassification of 
broadband supports a strong state regulatory role “with respect to IP-based services — particularly 
with respect to service quality and universal service.”) (“NARUC Transitions Ex Parte”).  
 169.  2015 Open Internet Order at ¶¶ 434-536 (detailing the FCC’s forbearance regime for 
newly reclassified broadband services).  See also Id. at ¶ 432 (making clear that “the states are 
bound” by this forbearance regime). 
 170.  See, e.g., George S. Ford & Lawrence J. Spiwack, Tariffing Internet Termination: Pricing 
Implications of Classifying Broadband as a Title II Telecommunications Service, 67 FED. COMM. 
L. J. 1 (2015).  
 171.  2015 Open Internet Order at ¶ 441. 
 172.  AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. at 385, fn. 10 (“The arguments we have been 
addressing . . . assume a scheme in which Congress has broadly extended its law into the field of 
intrastate telecommunications, but in a few specified areas (ratemaking, interconnection 
agreements, etc.) has left the policy implications of that extension to be determined by state 
commissions, which — within the broad range of lawful policymaking left open to administrative 
agencies — are beyond federal control.”). 
 173.  See supra, Sections II.B.2 & II.B.3, for additional discussion and examples. 
 174.  See, e.g., Sandoval Testimony (arguing that there are identifiable intrastate aspects of 
broadband service). 
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State PUCs could also argue that a particular regulatory action is in 
furtherance of their section 706(a) duties under sections of the Act from 
which the FCC has yet to forbear.  In its reclassification order, the FCC 
acknowledged that it was not “forbear[ing] with respect to provisions [of the 
Act] insofar as they merely reserved state authority.”175  Examples cited in 
the order include the ability of PUCs to designate “eligible 
telecommunications carriers” under section 214(e)(2) and reservations of 
authority under section 253.176  The latter section preserves state authority to 
“impose . . . requirements necessary to preserve and advance universal 
service, protect the public safety and welfare, ensure the continued quality 
of telecommunications services, and safeguard the rights of consumers.”177  
Even though the FCC elected to forbear from parts of section 254, which 
pertains to universal service, the other provisions of section 253 appear to 
provide the states with a potential basis for regulating certain aspects of 
broadband or IP-enabled services in their states. This kind of argument has 
already been made by the national organization that lobbies on behalf of state 
PUCs.178 
More broadly, reclassification could theoretically support state 
experimentation around what constitutes the “other regulating methods” 
included in section 706(a). 179   Indeed, reclassification could arguably 
provide state PUCs with more “regulating methods” than are presently 
available to them under the current regulatory paradigm.  A liberal reading 
of this clause could be supported by an argument that a state is compelled to 
implement a particular regulation under the directive included in section 706.  
For example, a state PUC could attempt to engage in a number of activities 
viewed as essential to being able to address “barriers to infrastructure 
investment.”  Certain activities like data collection could be framed as a 
condition precedent to meeting the statutory directive. 
Even though these arguments might seem plausible on their face, the 
FCC has nevertheless made it quite clear that it will preempt any regulatory 
activity that it deems inconsistent with its new approach to broadband 
services.180  In light of previous analyses demonstrating the enormous power 
 
 175.  2015 Open Internet Order at ¶ 531. 
 176.  Id. at fn. 1644. 
 177.  47 U.S.C § 253(b). 
 178.  See, e.g., NARUC Transitions Ex Parte (citing to reclassification in favor of state 
authority to regulate various aspects of VoIP service).  
 179.  See supra, section III.B. 
 180.  See supra, section III.C. 
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that the FCC has over the states in administering every aspect of the Act, 
including state-centric elements of Title II, PUCs would be wise to avoid 
attempting to regulate advanced services unless and until the FCC provides 
them with clear guidance regarding the parameters of any such action.181  
Instead, PUCs should consider working with other state actors to implement 
the framework discussed in the next section. 
IV.  Looking Beyond Section 706: A Principles-Based 
Framework for Improving Broadband Connectivity at the State 
Level 
The success of the regulatory framework for broadband that prevailed 
for more than a decade,182 coupled with the recent shift away from that 
framework and the continued uncertainty surrounding what section 706 
actually means in practice for the states,183 highlights the need for more 
clarity about the most appropriate balance of regulatory federalism going 
forward.  This section identifies the contours of an ideal framework to 
provide more clarity (section 4.1) and details an approach for applying it to 
state level actions meant to enhance broadband connectivity (section 4.2). 
A.  Formalizing the Framework: General Principles of Effective 
Broadband Regulation 
The regulation of markets requires a delicate balancing act by 
policymakers since their actions send crucial signals to market participants.  
How stakeholders interpret these signals is primarily impacted by the 
rationale underlying regulations, how the policymaking body implements 
those regulations, and whether regulators consistently apply the policies.184  
In the context of developing sustainable regulatory policies in the modern 
 
 181.  For example, there may be opportunities for states to implement federal frameworks that 
operate as both “floors” and “ceilings.”  Such an approach would allow for carefully calibrated and 
relatively uniform state participation, as opposed to unfettered and piecemeal experimentation by 
PUCs, an approach that has proven to be inefficient and harmful to the market for advanced 
communications services.  See Federalism in Transition at 1198.  
 182.  See supra, section II.  
 183.  See supra, section III. 
 184.  Shane Greenstein has noted that “private firms benefit from knowing how to anticipate 
the norms and standards employed by regulators to recognize the signs of health and unhealthy 
behavior in a situation that is changing so much [i.e., the broadband ecosystem].”  This interplay 
between innovator and regulator is essential to encouraging “innovative health.”  See Shane 
Greenstein, Glimmers and Signs of Innovative Health in the Commercial Internet, 8 J. ON 
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 25, 34 (2010). 
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communications space, the many positive impacts of regulatory minimalism, 
which emerged and prevailed for more than a decade prior to reclassification, 
provide persuasive evidence about the viability of this approach.185  More 
specifically, its inherent flexibility and adaptability accommodated growth 
and innovation in ways that more intrusive regulation could never allow.186  
This seems to be an optimal fit for what many expect will be even more rapid 
and more disruptive change in the coming years.187 
As policymakers investigate how a new interpretation of section 706 
might alter this dynamic, it is worthwhile to understand the foundations of 
the approach that yielded significant and sustainable consumer welfare 
gains.  The preceding analyses highlighted several key elements of this 
framework: 
 
The most effective regulation tends to reflect the nature of the market 
to which it is applied.  This maxim has certainly been true with wireless, 
broadband, and VoIP services.  The minimalist policies developed for these 
services reflected their borderless nature by being administered at the federal 
level and protecting against the development of a patchwork system of state 
level regulation.  Their flexibility and the ex post manner of enforcement was 
able to accommodate the rapid pace of innovation.  And their lack of 
proscribed behavior encouraged critical business model experimentation that 
delivered to consumers a range of choices that are increasingly tailored to 
meet their individual needs.188 
 
 185.  See Hassett, supra note 66. 
 186.  See, e.g., LARRY DOWNES & PAUL NUNES, BIG BANG DISRUPTION: STRATEGY IN THE 
AGE OF DEVASTATING INNOVATION 72 (2014) (“BIG BANG DISRUPTION”) (“. . . industries 
regulated as public utilities . . . must first obtain permission just to experiment with new 
technologies.  They also need approval to pass the cost of research and development projects along 
to ratepayers . . .  The degree of government oversight often translates to limits on the methods 
regulated industries employ to pursue disruptive innovation.”); Charles M. Davidson & Michael J. 
Santorelli, REALIZING THE SMART GRID IMPERATIVE: A FRAMEWORK FOR ENHANCING 
COLLABORATION BETWEEN ENERGY UTILITIES AND BROADBAND SERVICE PROVIDERS (2011),   
 187.  See, e.g., Downes, supra note 186 (discussing major trends and the potential for profound 
disruption in many sectors via the use of new and emerging technologies); ERIK BRYNJOLFSSON & 
ANDREW MCAFEE, THE SECOND MACHINE AGE: WORK, PROGRESS, AND PROSPERITY IN A TIME 
OF BRILLIANT TECHNOLOGIES (2014) (discussing how technology will likely disrupt nearly every 
facet of the economy).  See also Howard A. Shelanski, Adjusting Regulation to Competition: 
Toward a New Model for U.S. Telecommunications Policy, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 55 (2007) 
(discussing the relative merits of minimalism in the context of accommodating growth in the 
broadband space). 
 188.  The FCC’s decision to reclassify broadband is tantamount to a rebuke of the market 
dynamics that evolved under the previous regulatory regime.  To that end, some have argued that 
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Some measure of humility and self-restraint is critical to ensuring 
that regulatory entities don’t overreach.  FCCs led by both Democratic and 
Republican appointees exercised significant self-restraint and humility in 
heeding Congress’s bipartisan mandate to keep the Internet unfettered from 
regulation.  In particular, these Commissions did not attempt to create 
additional regulatory authority to police the emerging broadband sector.  To 
the contrary, the FCCs in the late 1990s and early 2000s worked carefully 
with a range of stakeholders, including counterparts at the state level, to 
develop a regulatory framework that could successfully foster growth of the 
emergent broadband ecosystem. 
 
Legacy regulation should not shackle outcomes.  Initial regulatory 
responses to the nascent broadband market, in particular Internet access 
services provided by telephone companies, were based on historical 
approaches to communications regulation, which were developed to protect 
against monopolies in a market characterized by a single platform, a single 
device, and a single category of service providers.189  However, once the 
FCC determined that the broadband market was fundamentally different 
from telephone markets and was not prone to “natural monopoly,” then the 
Commission shifted course.190  The FCC took a similar approach with VoIP 
and wireless telephony, opting to eschew intrusive regulation in favor of a 
more hands-off approach that could support rapid cross across a variety of 
market segments.  Shifting back to a more hands-on approach via 
reclassification will likely undermine core aspects of a regulatory regime that 
 
a move to common carrier regulation will undermine investment incentives and otherwise chill 
innovation in the broadband ecosystem.  See, e.g., Fred B. Campbell, Jr., Impact of “Title II” 
Regulation on Communications Investment: A Comparison Between the United States and the 
European Union, Internet Innovation Alliance (Feb. 2015), available at http://internetinnovation.org/ 
images/misc_content/Impact_of_Title_II_Regulation_on_Comms_Investment_-_FINAL.pdf. See 
also Hassett, supra note 66. 
 189.  Verizon, 740 F.3d at 630–31 (citing to the Advanced Services Order of 1998 and previous 
FCC rulings discussing how the Commission initially classified DSL service as a 
“telecommunications service” subject to Title II regulation). 
 190.  See, e.g., In the Matter of Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced 
Telecommunications Capability to all Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and 
Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications 
Act of 1996, First Report, 14 FCC Rcd. 2398, ¶ 48 (rel. Feb. 2, 1999) (concluding that “the 
preconditions for monopoly [were] absent” from the fledgling broadband market and noting that 
the data did “not indicate that the consumer market [for broadband was] inherently a natural 
monopoly”). 
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proved exceedingly successful in both the wireline and wireless broadband 
contexts.191 
Legislative guidance has been critical in honing effective regulatory 
approaches.  Although the 1996 Act barely mentioned the Internet, it 
nevertheless set forth a clear preference for keeping it free of unnecessary 
regulation.  While subsequent events have conspired to cast doubt on this 
straightforward congressional directive,192 initial interpretations by the FCC 
were mostly literal.  As discussed above, the result was the development of 
an innovative and competitive broadband ecosystem. Similarly, at the state 
level, legislation helped to clarify the limited role of PUCs vis-à-vis wireless, 
VoIP, and broadband services, further bolstering the national administration 
of a minimalist regulatory framework. 
 
Objectively collected and analyzed data has been essential to 
calibrating narrowly targeted regulatory responses.  Federal 
 
 191.  Comparisons between the Title II-based regulatory framework developed for wireless 
telephony and the new regulatory framework devised for broadband via reclassification are 
problematic for several reasons.  In the matter of Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 30 
FCC Rcd. at ¶¶ 421-423.  First, the regulatory framework for wireless telephony arose after 
Congress intervened to establish a national regulatory approach to what was then a very nascent, 
though increasingly popular service.  The resulting legislation provided clear directives to the FCC 
and the states regarding the appropriate level of regulation of the service.  Davidson & Santorelli, 
supra note 36, at 31–35.  Conversely, there is little evidence that Congress ever intended for the 
FCC to regulate broadband services in a similar manner.  See, e.g., discussion supra, section II.  
Second, the nature of the services and the markets in which they compete are significantly different.  
Wireless telephony delivers voice calls over cellular networks that are built atop swaths of spectrum 
and routed via towers and antennae; most calls eventually find their way onto the public switched 
telephone network (PSTN), which has long been regulated as a common carrier.  47 U.S.C. § 
332(d)(2) (1996).  Broadband, on the other hand, has always operated separate and apart from the 
PSTN.  This is a critical element of the service, which necessitated a different regulatory approach.  
Indeed, this was long seen as one of its defining characteristics — its ability to provide access to 
the Internet, itself characterized as a “network of networks,” in a variety of ways (e.g., via cable 
modem, DSL, fiber, mobile, etc.).  See, e.g., JONATHAN E. NUECHTERLEIN & PHILIP J. WEISER, 
DIGITAL CROSSROADS: TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY IN THE INTERNET AGE 178–85 
(2d ed. 2013) (discussing the technical architecture of broadband Internet access).  Reclassification 
of broadband has required a fundamental reorientation of how broadband networks operate — both 
on their own and in relation to the PSTN.  This dramatic shift in thinking has drawn significant 
criticism, with many faulting the Commission for misinterpreting its authority to make such 
decisions.  See, e.g., In the Matter of Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, GN Docket No. 
14-28, FCC Rcd at 15–25 (Mar. 12, 2015) (Ajit Pai, dissenting).  
 192.  These events include: (1) the Verizon decision, which introduced uncertainty regarding 
the extent to which section 706 conveys regulatory authority over broadband to the FCC and 
individual state PUCs, (2) recent federal case law that provides regulatory agencies like the FCC 
with broad discretion to interpret their enabling statutes, and (3) reclassification of broadband as a 
telecommunications service.  For further discussion, see discussion supra, section III. 
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communications law empowers the FCC to collect a range of data and 
requires it to use the data to produce reports on an array of discrete topics, 
including the status of broadband deployment193 and wireless competition.194  
In addition, the statute grants the Commission significant authority to 
interpret the means (i.e., analyses of the data) and ends (i.e., interpretation of 
the analyses) of these inquiries.  Until recently, reports regarding the 
broadband and wireless markets consistently reached favorable conclusions 
about the competitive health of each segment.  These reports confirmed the 
propriety of the minimalist regulatory frameworks that had been forged for 
each sector and made clear that broad regulatory interventions were 
unwarranted.  Recent FCCs, however, have been accused of inverting this 
data-driven approach by using these reports as a basis for crafting more 
intrusive regulatory policies, suggesting that congressional guidance might 
be necessary to protect against an abuse of discretion.195 
B.  Applying the Framework in Furtherance of Broadband Connectivity 
Goals at the State Level 
With broadband rapidly emerging as a policy priority in states across 
the country, PUCs will likely be tempted to leverage apparent regulatory 
authority under section 706 to contribute to these efforts.196  Indeed, in the 
 
 193.  47 U.S.C. § 1302(b) (2015) requires the FCC to “initiate a notice of inquiry concerning 
the availability of advanced telecommunications capability to all Americans (including, in 
particular, elementary and secondary schools and classrooms)” and shall use the inquiry to 
“determine whether advanced telecommunications capability is being deployed to all Americans in 
a reasonable and timely fashion.” 
 194.  47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(1)(C) (1996) calls on the FCC to “review competitive market 
conditions with respect to commercial mobile services and shall include in its annual report an 
analysis of those conditions.  Such analysis shall include an identification of the number of 
competitors in various commercial mobile services, an analysis of whether or not there is effective 
competition, an analysis of whether any of such competitors have a dominant share of the market 
for such services, and a statement of whether additional providers or classes of providers in those 
services would be likely to enhance competition.” 
 195.  See, e.g., Daniel Frankel, FCC Looks to Redefine Broadband, Raise Speed Threshold 
Above 10 Mbps, FIERCE CABLE (Jun. 2, 2014), http://www.fiercecable.com/story/fcc-looks-
redefine-broadband-raise-speed-threshold-above-10-mbps/2014-06-02 (reporting on FCC efforts 
to modify a key measure of broadband speeds, which would “significantly impact policy debates 
and how the FCC regulates Internet service providers.  With the greater benchmark, the commission 
could argue more stridently that ISPs aren’t offering consumers a true broadband experience.”).  
But see Verizon, 740 F.3d at 642 (noting that, while “suspicious” and “questionable,” the timing of 
recent FCC data analyses suggest that broadband not being deployed in a reasonable and timely 
manner gave the court “no basis to reject an otherwise reasonable finding”). 
 196.  Many states have adopted laws or launched programs focused on improving broadband 
connectivity.  For example, in early 2015 the governors of Iowa and New York announced 
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absence of formal clarification — by the FCC, the courts, or Congress — 
regarding the outer contours of state regulatory authority over broadband 
services post-Verizon and post-reclassification, PUCs may experiment with 
new rules and regulations meant to spur broadband deployment.  Despite 
their noble intent, however, these efforts would likely be met with 
preemption by the FCC or litigation by stakeholders attempting to reconcile 
the new contours of regulatory authority conveyed by section 706, as 
interpreted by the FCC and upheld by the federal courts, with the many 
limitations on that authority, which were noted above. 
To protect against unnecessary legal clashes or other outcomes that 
ultimately distract from the widely shared goal of improving broadband 
connectivity, PUCs and other state actors should seek to apply the general 
principles detailed in the preceding section to any broadband-related issue 
that might arise.  Indeed, rather than look to section 706 as a regulatory 
“Deus ex machine” or panacea capable of solving every broadband-related 
problem that might arise, PUCs should recognize that modern broadband 
planning is typically part of a much more comprehensive undertaking that 
involves a range of other state actors.  To these ends, the following principles 
are offered to guide the development and implementation of impactful 
broadband policies and programs at the state level. 
 
Clearly identify the broadband-related problem that needs to be 
addressed.  A key threshold inquiry for any state policymaker or government 
entity interested in bolstering broadband is to identify the extent to which 
there is a problem that needs to be solved.  A critical first step to that end 
will be to define the parameters of acceptable broadband connectivity from 
both the supply side (measured in availability and speed) and the demand 
side (measured in subscription rates and digital literacy).  Thereafter, 
resources can be more accurately targeted at realizing these more narrowly 
tailored goals. 
To date, policymakers at the state and federal levels have been focused 
almost exclusively on broadband supply issues, especially those ensuring 
 
ambitious plans to bolster broadband in their states.  See Press Release, Office of the Governor of 
the State of New York, Statewide Broadband Access for Every New Yorker (Jan. 16, 2015), 
https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/2015-opportunity-agenda-restoring-economic-opportunity-1 
(announcing $500 million in matching funds to support broadband deployment to underserved 
areas); Matthew Patane, Obama, Branstad Push Plans to Increase High-Speed Internet, DES 
MOINES REGISTER, Jan. 14, 2015, http://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/tech/2015/01/13/ 
branstad-obama-broadband-internet-access/21721085/ (proposing a $5 million grant program for 
similar purposes).   
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that a minimum level of speed is available to all residents.  The ideal level 
of speed, however, has been elusive as policymakers attempt to “future 
proof” networks rather than allow consumer demand to organically shape the 
marketplace.197  Even the FCC has sent mixed signals about what it deems 
to be “broadband.”  In January 2015, for example, the FCC concluded that 
broadband “requires access to actual download speeds of at least 25 Mbps 
and actual upload speeds of at least 3 Mbps.” 198   This represented a 
significant increase from the previous benchmark of 4 Mbps/1 Mbps, and 
served to disqualify mobile and satellite broadband connections from being 
considered when measuring whether a part of the country is deemed “served” 
by broadband.  But this conflicted with a determination made the month 
before that connections of at least 10 Mbps/1 Mbps were considered 
broadband for the purposes of directing universal service funding to support 
deployment of networks capable of offering such speeds.199  Equally curious 
is that, for reporting purposes, the FCC still deems broadband to be 
“available” in a given area if connections of at least 200 kbps are present.200 
Many states have similarly differing benchmarks for broadband. New 
York, for example, deems an area “unserved” if it lacks access to wireline 
connections of at least 6 Mbps/1.5 Mbps.201  This benchmark in California is 
786 kbps/200 kbps.202  Minnesota’s minimum threshold for broadband is 10 
 
 197.  For additional discussion regarding the myopic focus on speed by policymakers, see 
Charles M. Davidson & Michael J. Santorelli, Understanding the Debate Over Government-Owned 
Broadband Networks: Context, Lessons Learned, and a Way Forward for Policy Makers, at 17–18 
& 26, ACLP at New York Law School (June 2014), available at http://www.nyls.edu/ advanced-
communications-law-and-policy-institute/wp-content/uploads/sites/ 169/2013/08/ACLP-
Government-Owned-Broadband-Networks-FINAL-June-2014.pdf (“Understanding the Debate”). 
 198.  In the Matter of Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications 
Capability to All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate 
Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, as Amended by 
the Broadband Data Improvement Act, 2015 Broadband Progress Report and Notice of Inquiry on 
Immediate Action to Accelerate Deployment, at ¶ 3, GN Docket No. 14-126, FCC 15-10 (rel. Feb. 
4, 2015).  
 199.  In the Matter of Connect America Fund, Report and Order, at ¶ 4, WC Docket No. 10-
90, FCC 14-190 (rel. Dec. 18, 2014) (“CAF 2014 Order”).  
 200.  See FCC Form 477 – Instructions, FCC (Jun. 2015), http://transition.fcc.gov/form 
477/477inst.pdf. 
 201.  See, e.g., Press Release, Office of the Gov. of N.Y., Statewide Broadband Access for 
Every New Yorker (Jan. 16, 2015), available at https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/2015-
opportunity-agenda-restoring-economic-opportunity-1. 
 202.  See, e.g., FAQ About the California Interactive Broadband Map, ftp://ftp2.cpuc.ca.gov/ 
telco/BB%20Mapping/Interative%20Map/FAQ%20Broadband%20Map.pdf. 
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Mbps/6 Mbps,203 while Maine allocates funding in support of broadband 
deployment on a sliding scale according to speed, beginning with 
connections of at least 1.5 Mbps.204 
Although the existence of such differing views and measurements of 
broadband would seem to presage conflict between the states and the FCC, 
there has been little discord to date.  On the contrary, numerous states have 
moved forward with plans and programs focused on achieving goals built 
around their distinct views of broadband.  This dynamic could prove to be 
sustainable provided that the states retain some measure of autonomy to 
determine the most sustainable path forward in terms of identifying and 
pursuing practical broadband goals that make the most sense relative to their 
needs.205  A similar approach would also be beneficial on the demand side as 
states are uniquely positioned to coordinate efforts with municipalities and 
expert organizations working at the hyper-local level to bring more people 
online, provide relevant training, develop digital literacy skills, and 
otherwise ensure that users new and old have every opportunity to put their 
connections to meaningful and productive uses.206 
Successful state-led approaches to clearly defined broadband issues on 
both the supply side and demand side should continue to be informed by 
objective data and input from stakeholders actively engaged in the provision 
of connections and training services across the state.  In addition, states 
should consider institutionalizing such processes in order to ensure that their 
views of and approaches to broadband evolve in a manner that reflects the 
actual contours of the marketplace and consumer demand.  To this end, 
 
 203.  See, e.g., Press Release, Connected Minnesota, Minnesota Broadband Availability 
Speeds Have Increased, but Some Regions Still Lag Behind (Nov. 2014), available at http:// 
www.connectednation.org/minnesota-broadband-availability-speeds-have-increased-some-regions-
still-lag-behind.   
 204.  See Annual Report on the Activities of the ConnectME Authority, CONNECTME (Jan. 
2015), http://www.maine.gov/connectme/about/docs/ConnectME-AnnRpt2014.pdf. 
 205.  This includes the ability of state legislatures to manage the ways in which their 
subdivisions engage in broadband-related activities.  The FCC, citing sweeping authority under 
section 706, preempted two state laws that it has deemed restrictive of such municipal broadband 
efforts.  See 2015 Preemption Order, supra note 108.  Aside from compelling concerns about 
regulatory overreach by the Commission, which, if upheld, could upset the balance of federalism 
articulated in the U.S. Constitution, there are numerous other reasons for preserving a wide berth 
for state legislatures in the context of broadband planning.  See, e.g., Understanding the Debate, 
supra note 197. 
 206.  See, e.g., Understanding the Debate, supra, note 197 (providing numerous examples of 
how this might work in practice).  See also Charles M. Davidson, Michael J. Santorelli and Thomas 
Kamber, Toward a More Inclusive Definition of Broadband Adoption, 6 INT’L. J. OF COMM. 2255 
(2012) (examining and identifying successful elements of such multifaceted approaches to demand 
side issues).   
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establishing a multi-stakeholder task force or working group might prove 
beneficial for these purposes. 
 
Appreciate and leverage the core competencies of all state actors.  
Addressing broadband challenges — availability, adoption, and 
informed use — is not the exclusive province of any one agency or branch 
of state government.  On the contrary, it is a set of complex issues that 
increasingly requires multifaceted and interdisciplinary solutions. 
Over the past few years, state Governors, state legislators, state 
attorneys general, and numerous other state level policymakers have come 
together to forge and implement comprehensive broadband strategies.  
Viewing the role of PUCs through this lens provides additional context 
within which to view the prerogatives set forth in section 706.  Consequently, 
the PUC role in the grand scheme becomes much more narrowly defined and 
hinges on the extent to which its actions are complementary of additional 
efforts that might be undertaken by other state actors. 
A primary focus of many state level broadband activities has been to 
bolster broadband availability and adoption by supporting the activities of 
private ISPs and expert nonprofits.  Only a handful of states has established 
universal service funds for these purposes.207  The federal USF was recently 
reformed to support broadband as a supported service; the mechanics of that 
shift are still being developed and implemented.208  In addition, the FCC also 
expanded the federal Lifeline subsidy program to cover broadband.209  As a 
result, many states, often led by their Governors, have acted to jumpstart 
forward progress by allocating some public funding to support network 
deployment to unserved areas and to increase broadband use in under-
adopting communities, typically via public-private partnerships.210  These 
efforts have ranged widely in size and ambition from the allocation of five 
 
 207.  See, e.g., SHERRY LICHTENBERG, STATE UNIVERSAL SERVICE FUNDS 2014, NATIONAL 
REGULATORY RESEARCH INSTITUTE 17–20 (2015), http://nrri.org/download/nrri-15-05-state-usf/ 
(identifying only six states that have established funds in support of broadband deployment and 
adoption). 
 208.  See, e.g., CAF 2014 Order, supra note 199. 
 209.  See Lifeline and Link Up Reform and Modernization, Second Further Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking, Order on Reconsideration, Second Report and Order, and Memorandum Opinion and 
Order, WC Docket No. 11-42, FCC 15-71 (rel. June 22, 2015).   
 210.  For an overview of how effective public-private partnerships have been structured to 
address issues on both the supply side and demand side, see Understanding the Debate, supra note 
197, at 109–137. 
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million dollars in grant funding to further broadband in rural areas of Iowa211 
to a five-hundred-million-dollar grant program for similar purposes in New 
York. 212   These programs are typically administered by economic 
development agencies.  In some cases, these allocations require legislative 
approval as part of the budget process.213 
In addition, legislatures are increasingly focused on modernizing 
regulatory frameworks in order to support broadband connectivity efforts.  
These efforts have encompassed the repeal of many outdated requirements 
tied to basic telephone service; clarification of PUC jurisdiction over 
advanced communications services like wireless, VoIP, and broadband; and 
the removal of barriers impacting more robust usage of broadband in key 
sectors (e.g., healthcare).214  Oftentimes, legislative activity results in the 
reallocation of authority over certain aspects of communications service.  For 
example, some states have shifted responsibility for receiving and processing 
consumer complaints for certain services away from PUCs.215  In other cases, 
state attorneys general are using laws of general applicability to police 
nefarious activity in the communications space.216 
In sum, there are many options for impacting broadband in a state that 
do not stem from or hinge on expansive interpretations of section 706 by 
PUCs.  Indeed, the totality of state level authority to influence broadband 
outcomes is very robust, providing additional support for limiting PUC 
activity in this space to targeted nonregulatory interventions that further a 
state’s general vision for high-speed Internet access. 
 
Identify the least intrusive options available to address the problem. 
Even though section 706 contains the affirmative direction to “encourage the 
deployment” of broadband, the clause is nevertheless limiting in terms of the 
means available for achieving this end.  However, such limitations are not 
impervious to liberal readings. Indeed, the FCC has interpreted the range of 
 
 211.  Iowa Broadband Initiative, supra note 196. 
 212.  Statewide Broadband Access for Every New Yorker, supra note 196. 
 213.  See, e.g., id. 
 214.  See, e.g., Completing the Process, supra note 44; Examining the Role, supra note 44; 
Federalism in Transition, supra note 11. 
 215.  Id.  
 216.  See, e.g., Jim Puzzanghera, AT&T to Pay $105 Million to Settle ‘Mobile Cramming’ 
Cases, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2014) available at http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-att-
cramming-20141009-story.html (reporting on a settlement between AT&T, the FTC, and 50 state 
attorneys general to address “cramming” allegations). 
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“regulating methods” available to them for these purposes very broadly, 
suggesting that nearly anything could fall under this heading. 217   As 
previously noted, state PUCs could try to follow this lead when attempting 
to operationalize section 706.  Doing so, however, would ultimately be 
counterproductive for at least two reasons. First, most regulatory forays into 
the broadband market would likely be preempted by the FCC or struck down 
by the courts.218  Second, as discussed in the previous section, there are 
numerous other options for realizing broadband imperatives at the state level.  
PUCs, in other words, should not be seen as the exclusive or even the primary 
vehicle for achieving broadband goals. 
To the extent that PUC action is necessary in the context of addressing 
a particular broadband problem in a given state, regulators should attempt to 
identify the least intrusive options available to it for these purposes.  
Conversely, PUCs should avoid arguing that section 706 unlocks a spate of 
new regulatory powers because, in the vast majority of instances where state 
PUC activity might be deemed necessary or desirable vis-à-vis bolstering 
broadband, there are likely numerous other tools available for this purpose.  
For example, PUCs might act to relieve certain categories of service 
providers from legacy regulatory obligations, thus freeing up additional 
resources that might be better invested in broadband infrastructure.219 
Equally as important, state regulators should recognize that, even if 
section 706 does convey some measure of new authority over broadband, it 
does nothing to alter the resources — jurisdictional, economic, and otherwise 
— available to PUCs for these purposes.  Moreover, section 706 does not 
allow PUCs to overturn legislative restrictions that might limit their 
jurisdiction over certain services, nor does it make them agents of the FCC 
or the federal government for the purposes of realizing national broadband 
imperatives.220  To these ends, state PUCs appear best positioned to engage 
in small regulatory adjustments that might facilitate additional investment in 
broadband infrastructure.  Such efforts would certainly be in keeping with 
the spirit, if not the letter, of section 706. 
 
 217.  See supra, section III. 
 218.  See supra, section III.D. 
 219.  A leading example is hastening the transition to all-IP networks by relieving telephone 
providers of the obligation to maintain an increasingly under-utilized communications 
infrastructure (i.e., the copper-based PSTN).  As the FCC observed in 2010, these kinds of 
regulations “lead to investments in assets that could be stranded” and can result in “siphoning 
investments away from new networks and services.”  National Broadband Plan at 59.  
 220.  For further discussion, see NARUC Comments, supra note 163. 
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V.  Conclusion 
The pull of history can be intoxicating when charting a hypothetical 
course forward for telecommunications, especially in a space with roots that 
extend back to the 19th century.  Attempting to align policies around historic 
ideals is tempting because it is familiar.  Indeed, framing a particular decision 
as nothing more than the inevitable next step in the march of history, or as 
something that history requires, insulates the decision-maker in the cozy 
confines of nostalgia.  But nostalgia can be misleading, especially in a space 
that has witnessed developments that transcend anything in its long history.  
For the many reasons discussed throughout this paper, the most prudent path 
forward for PUCs attempting to decipher what section 706 actually means in 
practice is to embrace an interpretation that will yield less regulatory 
authority but that will nevertheless support more robust gains in broadband 
connectivity. 
The future is now for reenvisioning regulation in the broadband 
ecosystem.  Policymakers in state government are actively exploring the new 
contours of the modern communications space and considering a range of 
legal, regulatory, and public policy responses.221  The outcomes of these 
activities will set important precedents that will impact every effort by 
stakeholders in this space goinsg forward.  Accordingly, it is critical that 
state decision-makers calibrate their responses according to the many 
objective lessons offered by the history of regulation in this space, as well as 
the realities of operationalizing apparent grants of authority for regulating 
broadband services.  Doing so will yield practical policies and effective 
approaches for improving broadband connectivity.  The analyses in this 
paper support this approach to interpreting section 706 and establishing a 
new kind of federalism in the broadband space, one that looks beyond PUCs 
and embraces the core competencies, resources, and expertise of the many 
other state actors that are addressing these issues. 
 
 221.  As but one example, the PUC in New York launched an inquiry in 2014 to evaluate, 
among other things, the role of regulators in the 21st century telecommunications space.  See N.Y. 
State Dep’t of Public Service, In the Matter of a Study on the State of Telecommunications in New 
York State, Staff Assessment of Telecommunications Services, Case 14-C-0370 (Jun. 23, 2015), 
available at http://documents.dps.ny.gov/public/Common/ViewDoc.aspx?DocRefId= 
{3DDDC8A5-E94A-4873-886C-3D73F68EC9AB} (setting forth a detailed study of telephone, 
video, and broadband service in the state); N.Y. State Dep’t of Public Service, In the Matter of a 
Study on the State of Telecommunications in New York State, Notice Seeking Comment, Case 14-
C-0370 (Jun. 23, 2015), http://documents. dps.ny.gov/public/Common/ViewDoc.aspx? 
DocRefId={223DA168-744D-47F6-B9FD-A63DFAs026F27} (soliciting public feedback on 
whether and to what extent the role of the PUC might need to change in light of new 
telecommunications market dynamics).  For additional examples of state regulators and legislators 
engaging in similar reassessments, see generally Examining the Role, supra note 44. 
